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ABSTRACT 
 Americans express support for “the environment” with environmental support cutting 
across political and demographic differences and cleavages. In the past 15 years, however, period 
effects, political sorting, and the emergence of a powerful anti-environmental movement have 
lessened the generalized levels of environmental support. Using the 2012 CCES survey, the 
expressed attitudes regarding multiple environmental issues found significant differences in 
levels of environmental support nationally by party, Tea Party attitudes, ideology, and certain 
demographic characteristics. For Floridians, the differences between the most pro-environmental 
respondents and the most anti-environmental are narrower; partisan identification itself is not 
significant in environmental attitudes; but ideology, Tea party support, and to a lesser degree, 
gender and race are associated in explaining variances in environmental attitudes. Voting 
decision behavior previously observed only for certain environmental issues appears to be 
influenced by multiple environmental positions. The significance of age on environmental 
attitudes remains perplexing with evidence for both younger and older respondents’ support for 
environmentalism, as compared to the support expressed by persons aged 40-59. Support and 
opposition for a specific Florida constitutional ballot proposition on environmental land 
conservative acquisition reflect partisan and gender divides, and the impact of attitudes regarding 
an unpopular elected national official. Environmentalism appears to be further evidence of the 
“Big Sort” in American politics, increasingly likely to be used as an interparty wedge issue and 
for intraparty base mobilizations. The need for further research and the implications for 
environmental activists conclude this thesis.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Major statewide Florida partisan elections in the 2010's were closely contested. President 
Obama won Florida’s 29 electoral votes in 2012 by 74,309 votes, less than one percent of all 
votes cast for President.1 Rick Scott was reelected governor in 2014 by 63,145 votes, only 
slightly more than one percent of all votes cast for governor.2 In the same election in 2014, 
Florida voters overwhelmingly approved the Water and Land Conservation Amendment, 
commonly called Amendment One, by a margin of over 2.8 million votes,3 well in excess of the 
60% approval threshold required for Florida constitutional amendments. Approximately 95% of 
the voters who cast a ballot for governor in 2014 also cast a ballot on Amendment One. For 
Amendment One to pass by such a wide margin, a significant number of Republican Rick Scott 
voters voted in favor of Amendment One. Republican identifiers are becoming increasingly more 
skeptical of environmental measures, and less supportive of environmental issues and spending. 
Florida voters in 2014 did not demonstrate this same partisan split, at least with regard to 
Amendment One. Three-fourths of voting Floridians approved required levels of spending on 
land and water acquisitions, albeit from a specified fee source and not from general revenues or 
new taxation. This specific environmental issue seemed to cross partisan and ideological lines, to 
garner widespread, generalized support for environmental spending. This thesis will examine 
general environmental attitudes in Florida; and, analyze the circumstances and conditions under 
which partisan Republican voters in Florida will vote contrary to their party’s general 
environmental issue opposition to support specific ballot proposals regarding environmental 
programs. Simply put, why did over one million Republicans vote for the environment?4 
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PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
The Moral and Ethical Roots of American Environmentalism  
 From the first moment early humans looked to the heavens, their feet remained planted 
firmly in the environment. The environment gave the sustenance and materials for life; while at 
the same time was the source of fear, threat, and danger. The human search for immediate 
survival and eternal meaning inextricably linked the physical with the metaphysical; the heavens 
with the earth. The environment was both an object of wonder, and a demon to be subdued.  
 In some Judeo-Christian teachings, wilderness became an evil, immoral place; the 
residence of the devil and not of God. The duty of humans was to subdue and have dominion 
over nature. This dominion theology influenced early Americans and early American 
environmental attitudes. If wilderness were evil and corrupting of humans, God required the 
subjection of wilderness. Applying this same religious belief system, pioneers moving west 
viewed wilderness as something fearful to be subdued and to be converted from evil to a use that 
would beneficial to humans (Nash 2001 [1967]: 15, 17, 31, 35, 262). As Americans turned to the 
arid west, as part of this country’s manifest destiny to settle the entire continent, the same 
dichotomous view of the environment colored their views of the desert. The desert was both an 
empty area to subdue, and a specific environment with its own unique beauty (Worster 1985: 70-
73).  
Different religious and philosophical thought provided a counterbalance to the dominion 
and subjugation impulses. The wilderness and the environment were the source of awe, wonder, 
and spiritual fulfillment. In Deist thought, God’s majesty and power were revealed directly in 
wilderness, unaltered by cities and civilization. Romanticists were attracted to the wild, believing 
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happiness increased with less civilization. Transcendental thinkers such as Thoreau and Emerson 
rejected the Calvinistic concept that humans were inherently sinful and would run amok in the 
wilderness. To Thoreau, a person had to enter wilderness (an outward journey), to develop 
inwardly. Individuals needed both wilderness and civilization to be fully human (Nash 2001 
[1967], 46, 47, 86, 91, 93-94). The split in beliefs between a religious view (in the sense of 
conservative domination dogma) of the environment and a more spiritual holistic view of the 
environment remains observable in modern times. A view of the environment as a place to find 
“god in nature” lessened the rates of adherence and support of traditional religious 
denominations (Ferguson & Tamburello 2015: 12-15).  
The conflicting views of environment as a resource to be managed and used, or the 
environment to be set aside and protected, influenced early American environmentalism. The 
conservationists were interested in the managed use of resources. Resources that ultimately must 
be depleted, such as minerals, coal, and oil should be used (and ultimately depleted) in the most 
efficient means possible to last the longest time possible. Renewable resources, such as timber 
and water, required management to assure sufficient use for the present and availability in the 
future. The conservationists represented a very utilitarian view of resources use (Pinchot 1947, 
excerpted in Nash 1990: 73- 79). The second group, the preservationists, wanted portions of the 
environment completely set aside and not used, free from human incursion or use. The human 
presence in nature threatened nature, and therefore portions of nature should be protected from 
humans (Marsh 1864, excerpted in Nash 1990: 40-44). The precious and irreplaceable properties 
such as wilderness and the beauty of nature should be set aside and not used by anyone, 
regardless of the value of resources located within the preserved lands (Leopold 1949, excerpted 
in Nash 1990: 171-174). Pinchot and the conservationists, as part of the Progressive Era, with the 
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strong support of President Theodore Roosevelt, prevailed in federal governmental actions. 
While the Wilderness Act did set aside lands for preservation, this preservationist legislation 
passed only in 1964, and was applicable to select lands (Stegner 1960, excerpted in Nash 1990: 
175-180; see also Nash headnote 1990:175). The American National Park system and National 
Forest system conserved land for recreational use and availability, while permitting some 
economic use. The Florida land purchase program, for which Amendment One provided specific 
funding, followed this federal conservation land acquisition and use model for protection of 
lands with an expressed utilitarian purpose. Florida conservation lands purchased must be 
environmentally sensitive and important, but also must be available for recreational purposes.  
These conflicting views of nature as evil or good, of the environment as a resource for 
humans or as something of independent sacred worth, of humans possessing dominion or 
exercising stewardship over the environment, of utilitarian conservation or radical preservation, 
remained strong in American environmentalism. The American environmental dualism expanded 
to consideration of the proper role of government in numerous policy matters, as a source of 
political decisions, beliefs, and actions, will be explored in more detail in the following sections 
of the research review. Dominion theology drives current conservative religious attitudes 
regarding environmentalism. Economic interests and power elites call for opening of national 
parks and wildernesses for even more resource utilization.  Different groups view the 
environment differently. The battle today may well be characterized as a fight between the 
descendants of the managed conservations of the Progressive Era and those who for economic 
and ideological reasons want immediate and total use of all available resources. The environment 
for the environment’s sake, as an object of reverence and appreciation is all very well and good. 
Americans generally “support” the environment.  But such sentimentality and indeed long-range 
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concerns about environmental difficulties frequently yield to more immediate issues and 
controversy, to period effects, and to the ideological dispute as to the proper role of government 
regarding environmental matters challenging any attempt to drive political action based upon 
environmental concerns. 
Environmentalism in Florida 
 Florida has a long history of bipartisan environmental support. Florida’s tourism 
economy and attractiveness to business and new residents depend on the environment. To protect 
Florida’s important but fragile environment, Florida’s legislature has been willing to pass 
comprehensive laws designed to protect Florida’s environment and manage its resources. 
Legislation included the 1972 Water Resource Act to create five water management districts; and 
gave those districts ad valorem tax authority in 1976  (MacManus, et al., 2011: 417). The Growth 
Management Act in 1985 required local authorities (counties and municipalities) to create 
growth management plans and established the Department of Community Affairs to approve and 
regulate these plans.  Developers paid impact fees; and any new development must assure 
governmental authorities that infrastructures and services were in place to handle any increased 
population or traffic (MacManus, et al., 2011: 412, 431-432). The Healthy Beaches Program was 
enacted in 2002 (MacManus, et al., 2011: 421). Floridians may even choose from three different 
wildlife automobile license plates; the proceeds from which go to protect these threatened or 
endangered species (MacManus, et al., 2011: 427). 
Preservation of sensitive and environmentally significant lands has been a 50-year 
Florida legislative priority, beginning with the 1963 creation of the Land Acquisition Trust Fund 
(deHaven-Smith 1988: 283). The legislature created the Environmental Endangered Lands 
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program, and voters approved a constitutional bond referendum to fund the program in 1992 
(Farr & Brock 2006: 35-36). The legislature revised the land acquisitions legislation in 1980 by 
enacting the “CARL” program, Conservation and Recreational Lands. First Preservation 2000 
and then Florida Forever expanded and revised the CARL program.  Preservation 2000 stabilized 
the source for environmental land acquisition funding (Farr & Brock 2006: 42). The current 
Florida Forever program, enacted in 2000 (Farr & Brock 2006: 35-38; MacManus, et al., 2011: 
419), created a new governmental board for management, set performance measures, and 
focused on urban and community parks in addition to more rural lands (Farr & Brock 2006: 38). 
Florida created a trust fund for the acquisition and administration of environmentally sensitive 
public lands. The lands were obtained for environmental reasons, but also for recreational 
purposes, confirming a strong conservative management ethos in Florida regarding acquired 
lands. Further land acquisition programs such as Save Our Coast and Save Our Rivers, and 
specific bond funding for each program, targeted purchases of land in coastal and river areas 
(Farr & Brock 2006: 36-27).  
 Republican governors as well as Democratic governors supported this environmental 
legislation (Farr & Brock 2006: 35). Preservation 2000 was a program of Republican Governor 
Bob Martinez (Farr & Brock 2006: 37). Even Governor Jeb Bush, an early leader in the 
implementation of conservative right to life and defunding Planned Parenthood issues (which 
remain strong conservative issues in the 2016 Republican presidential primary), took pro-
environmental positions notwithstanding his general social conservatism. The Florida Forever 
program was a major initiative of Governor Bush (Farr & Brock 2006: 38). Current Republican 
Governor Rick Scott seems to be breaking from this bipartisan governmental environmental 
tradition in Florida. In his first term, Governor Scott championed legislation to weaken the 
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Growth Management Act and essentially eliminated the Department of Community Affairs 
(MacManus, et al., 2011: 432-433). The current legislature and Governor Scott reduced funding 
for the Florida Forever land trust in multiple legislative sessions (MacManus, et al., 2011: 419). 
These cuts in funding for the land acquisition trust fund led to the 2014 Amendment One 
constitutional ballot initiative to require that one-third of revenues from documentary stamps 
charged to real estate buyers for all real property purchases be utilized by the Conservation and 
Recreation Lands Trust Fund.  
Environmentalism as a Generalized American Belief 
Events of the 1960s and 1970s, such as the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring 
in 1962 and Earth Day 1970, heralded the start of the modern American environmental 
movement. Early research established widespread environmental support in many groups, often 
only weakly associated with demographic and political variables. By the end of the 1980’s, 
multiple public opinion studies summarized by Dunlap (1991) showed generalized support for 
environmental positions. Polling revealed general support for increasing government spending 
on the environment (71%), increasing governmental regulation of the environment (65%), 
increasing environmental protection regardless of the cost (75%), and a general belief that 
environmental regulation has not gone far enough to protect the environment (54%) (Dunlap 
1991: 10, 12).  With opposition to these various propositions at only 4% to 16%, the 
environment became essentially a consensus issue in American politics (Dunlap 1991: 12).  The 
increased belief that environmental conditions locally and globally were declining from 
increasing threats to health and human life not simply quality of life matters, and a belief that 
only limited efforts had been made in improving the environment, encouraged environmental 
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support (Dunlap 1991: 14-15). This increasing environmental support could also have been in 
response to the perceived anti-environmentalist of the Reagan Administration (Dunlap 1991: 13-
14). Notwithstanding the anti-environmentalism of the Reagan Administration, a strongly pro-
environmental electorate reelected President Reagan in the second largest electoral landslide in 
history. Environmental position was not important in vote choice (46% said it made no 
difference). For respondents who indicated that candidate environmental positions made a 
difference in individual voting choice, the environment usually was not an important factor in 
voting choice (Dunlap 1991: 31-32).  
Guber (2003) also finds national public opinion strongly “pro-environment.” Floridians 
share that generalized environmental support (MacManus, et al., 2011: 414-415). Guber found 
large majorities state concern for a wide range of specific environmental issues such as global 
warming or species eradication. Generalized support and future concerns regarding the 
environment did not translate to current voting action (Guber 2003).  There was no significant 
support for an environmental “Green” party in the United States. Environmental concerns were 
viewed as something that could be “put off” until the future. To open ended “what’s the most 
important issue” or “what’s the worse problem” questions, for present concerns, responses 
regarding the environment were low. Environmental policy did not reach the level of issue 
salience significant to become a significant determinative factor in a voting choice in these 
studies. However, environmental harms were the highest expressed concern for the future (Guber 
2003; Yeager, et al., 2011: 2, 21; Daniels, et al., 2012: 462, 467).   
Even in the heady days of environmental awareness following Earth Day, other factors 
were expected to cause ebbs and flows in levels of environmental support (Downs 1972). When 
policy options or potential costs for environmental programs were considered with regard to 
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specific environmental concerns, the high levels of generalized environmental support decreased 
significantly. Factors such as support for tax cutting, concerns about government regulation, and 
the costs of implementing environmental protection significantly reduce public support for a 
specific environmental policy proposal (Guber 2003). When considered in relation to other 
issues, such as crime or economic issues, environmental concerns were less salient than other 
issues. Even before the partisan divide on environmental issues became pronounced, as discussed 
below, the generalized environmental support lessened when actual policy choices are presented 
(Guber 2003; Fisher, et al. 2013; Downs 1972). Period effects, including changes in economic 
conditions or security concerns, also affected the level of support for environmental issues 
(Scruggs & Benegal 2012; Daniels, et al., 2012: 470). During times of general economic well 
being, there may be increased support for governmental expenditures for environmental 
protection. Initial enthusiasm for environmental concerns after Earth Day 1970, including public 
opinion polling showing environmental quality as the top voter priority, lessened significantly as 
a result of the 1974 energy crisis and oil embargo (Lake 1983). Intensity of environmental 
support decreased from 2000 to 2006, as a result of the intervening issue salience of the 9/11 
terrorist events and subsequent war in Iraq (McCright and Dunlap 2008). Varied levels of media 
concern over time affected the salience of an issue at any particular time.  Increased media 
coverage of an environmental issue, such as pollution, increased the level of support for spending 
on environmental issues (Elliot et al., 1995). Conservative media outlets may encourage 
conservative political action including the rise of Tea Party support (Williamson, et al. 2011: 29-
30). Tea Party support is discussed below as one factor in the increasing anti-environmentalism 
in the Republican Party. Considerations of policy options and costs, salience of other issues, 
period effects, and media coverage affected the levels of environmental support. 
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Environmentalism therefore may be described more properly as a consensus social movement 
(characterized by general societal acceptance, but with other more immediate concerns 
determining political actions such as voting), with the possibility of personal and political action, 
rather than an ideology (which would be a compelling basis for actions such as voting) (Meyer 
and Staggenborg, 1996: 1629, 1633; McCright and Dunlap 2008).  
Environmental concern and action may also indicate a postmaterialistic worldview. 
Postmaterialism posits that once material and security needs were met for an individual and a 
country in general, respondents would be socialized in a materially secure country and develop a 
worldview emphasizing quality of life issues. Inglehart created an initial scale based on four 
questions (respondents were asked to chose national goals of two of four possible responses: (1) 
maintain national order (2) more input into governmental action (3) protect free speech or (4) 
maintain a high rate of economic growth); and subsequently expanded the question sets to create 
a materialism/postmaterialism scale from a series of four option questions (Inglehart & 
Abramson 1999). Environmentalism indicated a concern with the quality of life, and therefore 
was more likely a trait of postmaterialists (Inglehart 1995; Kidd & Lee 1997, 5-6, 8-9 Table 1 
and Table 2). Other researchers have found strong environmental support in poor economic 
countries as well as in wealthier more industrialized countries (Dunlap & York 2008, 542, 550), 
calling into question the link between postmaterial values and environmental support.  
Even widespread consensus movements, such as environmentalism, create the conditions 
for a countermovement to arise. Conservative supporters of the existing political and economic 
power and social structures were likely to oppose environmental actions (McCright and Dunlap 
2013: 215, 223; Dunlap and Van Liere 1984: 1015).  The political and economic elites took 
actions to protect the dominant power structure (McCright & Dunlap 2010), including funding 
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conservative think tanks to attack the science of environmental issues such as global warming, to 
undermine the need for policy and lifestyle changes necessary to mitigate and adapt to climatic 
change and other environmental issues (Jacques, et al. 2008; McCright & Dunlap 2012, 215). 
These political and ideological changes have been the underpinnings for the countermovement of 
the anti-environmentalists (Meyers and Staggenborg, 1996: 1633).  This countermovement then 
promoted the rise of anti-environmentalism as an immediate political force, lessening the 
generalized pro-environmental attitude of American respondents. The results found by both 
Dunlap (1991) and Guber (2003) did not anticipate the effects of this anti-environmental 
countermovement.   
Partisanship and American Environmentalism 
Partisan identification has emerged in recent research as the strongest explanation for 
variance in levels of environmental support. Ideology, rather than party identification, previously 
explained variance in environmental support in a megastudy of environmental research. Liberal 
ideology was strongly associated with environmental support, while party identification was at 
best weakly associated (Dunlap 1980: 191-192). An early study found that environmental voters 
indeed trended conservative and Republican in California (Lake 1983). Over the past ten years, 
the previous consensus found on environmental support which cut across other voting cleavages 
such as party identification and ideology (Guber 2003; Guber 2001b; Dunlap 1991) has given 
way to sharp partisan divides on support for environmental propositions (Dunlap & McCright 
2008; Uyeki & Holland 2000). Most recent studies have found a robust relationship between 
Democratic identification and strong environmental support (Uyeki & Holland 2000). Partisan 
identification is now the strongest explanatory variable in determining environmental support 
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(Coan & Holman 2008). Guber’s finding of generalized support (2003) and her statement that no 
candidate will come out against environmental concerns (2001: 466) may no longer be true in 
this more highly charged and divided political milieu with marked partisan differences on 
environmental issues and with an active countermovement attempting to lessen consensus 
attitudes regarding the environment.  
Public opinion polling for 30 years showed increasing levels of belief in scientific 
consensus, human causes for climate changes, and feeling personally “very worried” about 
climate change (consistent with the findings of Dunlap 1991), until 2008, when all levels of 
public support for environmental positions dropped precipitously (Scruggs & Benegal 2012). 
Gaps in level of support for environmental beliefs, driven by party identification, have emerged 
for the belief that global warming is already happening (Democrats support this proposition by 
34 points more than Republicans), the belief that media coverage of global warning is 
exaggerated (Republicans support this proposition by 42 points more than Democrats), whether 
there is a consensus among scientists regarding the causes of climate change (Democrats support 
this proposition by 24 points more than Republicans), and whether there are human causes for 
climate change (Democrats support this proposition by 32 points more than Republicans) 
(Dunlap & McCright 2008).  
Guber’s most recent research indicated that the previous generalized consensus regarding 
environment is lessening. Studying Gallop poll results in ten-year intervals (for years 1990, 
2000, and 2010), Guber found that partisan differences existed on environmental beliefs, 
including the human causation effects on global warming, air pollution, loss of tropical rain 
forest, and other environmental issues. Republicans, Democrats, and Independents expressed 
similar levels of concern regarding the six environmental issues in 1990, but an interparty divide 
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in levels of support emerged in 2000 and grew larger in 2010 (2013: 103 Figure 2, 103, 104). 
The partisan divide on environmental issues was larger than on other economic and policy issues 
(Guber 2013: 95, 105, 106 Figure 3). General concern regarding the environment was declining, 
perhaps as an issue period effect (Guber 2013: 100 Figure 1, 101; cf. Downs 1972). Guber’s 
OLS multivariate regression of levels of environmental support showed that partisanship and 
ideology were significant in 2000 and 2010. Demographic controls generally were not significant 
in 1990 and 2000; but by 2010, statistically significant increased levels of environmental support 
expressed by non-whites existed; with decreased levels of environmental support stated by male 
and higher income respondents (Guber 2013: 104 Table 1). Environmental support that previous 
cut across other cleavages appeared increasingly identified with certain groups. This divide will 
lessen the ability to achieve consensus on environmental values, reducing the previously 
generalized “pro-environmental” attitudes of the American public (Guber 2013: 108).  
Partisan differences have emerged in other aspects of political behavior, campaign 
activities, and elite actions. Although not studying environmental voting or activism, per se, 
Dolan demonstrated the identification of environmental policy with party choice and ideology 
(2005).  For both female and male Democratic candidates, the environment was the fifth issue 
mentioned on campaign websites. Environmental issues were not listed for either male or female 
Republican candidates. Gender alone does not explain the difference as female candidates acted 
like male candidates in the same party. The party identification and ideology of the candidate 
determined whether or not the candidate took a pro-environmental stance. Presumably, the 
Democratic candidate would express a general policy preference of “protecting the environment” 
and the Republican candidate would express a general policy preference “against government 
regulation” and to avoid costs to businesses and taxpayers for such regulations. Voters expected 
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the Democratic candidate to mention environmental issues. Candidates listed environmental 
issues to attract those voters who ideological positioning includes environmental policy as part of 
their ideology (Dolan 2005). Elite partisan differences on environmental issues have long 
appeared. Northern Democratic members of the 92nd Congress supported roll-call environmental 
measures; northern Republican members in the same Congress did not.  Party identification, not 
regional differences, explained environmental support (Dunlap and Allen 1976).  
It may, however, be too simplistic to view the partisan divide on environmental attitudes 
and issues as strictly a Democratic versus Republican divide. The emergence of strong Tea Party 
influence within the Republican Party (Williamson, et al., 2011), based both upon a deep seated 
mistrust of governmental action and the intentional conservative think tank attacks on science, 
especially climate science (Jacques, et al., 2008: 356, 357), have polarized support regarding 
environmental issues.  Tea party members are among the most conservative Republicans 
(Skocpol & Williamson 2012; Williamson, et al., 2011). Compared to non-Tea Party supporters, 
those with a favorable opinion of the Tea Party voted overwhelming Republican even when 
generally distrustful of the Republican Party as being too cooperative with Democrats (and 
especially President Obama); strongly identified themselves as conservative; and were more 
likely to support the 2011 government shutdown than non-Tea Party Republicans or 
Independents (Skocpol & Williamson 2012: 27-28). Tea Party Republicans expressed higher and 
more vocal levels of mistrust of Obama. Ninety-one percent of Tea Party members expressed an 
unfavorable opinion of President Obama, compared with 68% of non-Tea Party Republicans 
(Skocpol & Williamson 2012:  210 n25). A split of opinion within the Republican Party, 
therefore, may drive the difference in environmental support between Democratic and 
Republican identifiers.  
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The differences between Tea Party Republicans and non-Tea Party Republicans may 
explain a significant portion of the variance in levels of support for environmental concerns 
between Republicans and Democrats (Hamilton & Saito 2015). Partisan identification has been 
measured as a three point self-identification scale (Democrat, Republican, Independent), or on a 
seven point scale derived from a follow up question designed to develop the strength of partisan 
identification (strong or weak identifier) and the partisan leaning of respondents initially self-
identifying as “independent” (lean Democrat, lean Republican). The seven point scale has been 
called more reliable, as “leaner” independents often behave similar to strong identifiers, and that 
the changes in partisan identification are better understood as short-term changes in intensity 
responding to period events rather than long-term changes in actual partisan identification 
(Magelby, et al., 2011; Rice & Hilton 1996). Hamilton & Saito considered the three-point 
partisan identification scale as reliable as the seven-point scale for predicting environmental 
support (2015: 213). Hamilton & Saito argue, however, that a four-point partisan identification 
scale may be more accurate than the traditional three-point partisan identification scale to explain 
variances in environmental support.  Tea Party supporters are primarily Republican identifiers 
(Hamilton & Saito 2015: 223) and among the most conservative Republicans (Williamson, et al., 
2011: 26-27). Among Republican identifier respondents, Tea Party identifiers have lower levels 
of support for climate change questions, while non-Tea Party Republicans have support levels 
similar to Independents on most environmental issues. Republicans are further from Tea Party 
Republicans than Republicans are from Independents on policy positions (Hamilton & Saito 
2015: 219, 221, 224). Tea Party support within the Republican Party therefore performed as a 
fourth partisan identification explaining some of the variance in environmental responses 
between Democratic identifiers and Republican identifiers (Hamilton & Saito 2015: 224).  
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Florida Tea Party supporters also may differ with non-Tea Party Florida Republicans in 
respect to environmental attitudes. Rick Scott was elected with Tea Party support (Skocpol & 
Williamson 2012:168, 192; Williamson, et al., 2011: 34-35). In Florida polling conducted in 
2011 and 2014 [not the part of any particular study], very conservative respondents in Florida 
were more likely to approve of Scott, and express the willingness to vote for him in 2011 and in 
2014 than levels expressed by somewhat less conservative respondents. [The 2011 results: 
approval: 46% somewhat conservative, 65% very conservative; vote again: 56% somewhat 
conservative, 81% very conservative. The approval gap between somewhat conservative and 
very conservative narrowed in September 2014 (63% and 83%) and even narrower in November 
2014 at election time when all Republicans would be expected to express support for the party 
nominee (64% and 75%).] Differences regarding disapproval of President Obama expressed 
within conservatism were not as pronounced as differences regarding Governor Scott, but still 
observable. [The 2011 results: somewhat conservative 74% disapproval, very conservative 84% 
disapproval; September 2014: 79% and 94%; November 2014: 80% and 85%.] (Public Policy 
Polling, March 29, 2011; Public Policy Polling, September 9, 2014; Public Policy Polling, 
November 2, 2014). While being “very conservative” or viewing President Obama unfavorably 
do not measure directly Tea Party approval, as Tea Party supporters are among the most 
conservative Republicans and most strongest opponents of President Obama (Skocpol & 
Williamson 2012; Williamson, et al., 2011), the observable differences in approval levels for 
Governor Scott and President Obama between somewhat conservative and very conservative 
Floridians hinted at possible Tea Party divisions within the Republican Party in Florida. Further 
empirical studies should be undertaken to determine if this observable difference in attitudes is 
driven by differences in levels of Tea Party approval.  
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Question framing may also contribute to the partisan divide in environmental attitudes. 
Schuldt, et al., used the 2009 American Life Panel randomized internet survey, alternating the 
climatic question to reference that the temperature was “going up” with resulting global warming 
with a question referencing that temperature was “changing” resulting in climate change (2001, 
118). When the issue was categorized as “climate change” instead of “global warming,” the 
partisan divide on whether or not the phenomenon existed decreased from 42.9% for “global 
warming” to 26.2% for “climate change” (Schuldt, et al., 2011: 120). This decrease in the 
partisan divide resulted from the unacceptability of the term “global warming” to Republicans 
(44.0% of Republicans believed “global warming” is real compared to 60.2% who believed 
“climate change” is occurring). Independents had observable slightly lower percentages of 
support than Democrats, but no statistically significant variance in responses regardless of the 
question phrasing (Schuldt, et al., 2011: 122). This difference in the observable divide between 
Republicans and Democrats depending on question wording was driven by the conservative 
think tank attacks on global warming and its science discussed above. Conservative think tanks 
attack the phrase global warming, making that term an anathema to Republicans (Schuldt, et al., 
2011: 117; cf. Jacques, et al., 2008). Global warming also implied human causation requiring 
adaptive and mitigation responses opposed by economic elites. Climate change seemed to be a 
natural phenomenon and therefore not threatening to the elites, as policy changes could not affect 
what is caused naturally (McCright & Dunlap 2010: 120). Villar and Krosnick similarly found 
that Independents considered “climate change” and “global warming” equally seriously, 
Republicans perceived “climate change” as more serious than “global warming,” and Democrats 
believed “global warming” was more serious than “climate change” (2011: 4-5). 
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Regardless of the cause of the observable and measurable difference in Democratic and 
Republican attitudes regarding the environment, the question remained as to whether these 
differences in environmental support were associated with vote choice. In presidential elections, 
respondents perceived Democratic Party policies as better able to care for the environment 
(Guber 2003). Thirty-one percent of Republicans indicated that the Democratic Party was better 
able to handle environmental matters. However, identification of the Democratic Party as the 
“pro” environmental party did not cause any shift of Republicans voting for Democrats, 
notwithstanding strong environmental concern. This result was consistent with findings that the 
intensity and depth of environmental support, partisan identification, more pressing immediate 
issues, and beliefs regarding the role of government, influence national elections (Guber 2003). 
Guber studied the 1996 presidential election, and found that environmental issues did not 
influence presidential voting choice because of: (1) the low salience of environmental issues; (2) 
no perceived differences between the candidates on the environment in 1996; and (3) the 
generalized environment support which cuts across other voting cleavages such as party 
identification and ideology (Guber 2001b). Guber’s (2001b) methodology and findings have 
been challenged (Davis & Wurth 2003).  
Guber measured environmental support (2001b) using the 7-point Likert scale question 
regarding environment versus jobs as her independent variable.  Respondents selected whether 
the environment or the economy were more important, or took a position somewhere in between. 
Davis & Wurth used a question of “should governmental spending on the environment 
increase/decrease/remain the same” as the independent variable (Davis & Wurth 2003). Davis & 
Wurth, unlike Guber (2001b), found that voters in the 1996 presidential election did consider the 
candidates’ environmental positions in evaluating the candidate and in making presidential vote 
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choice. Davis & Wurth found that responses regarding levels of governmental environmental 
spending were (a) significant in predicting the feeling thermometer evaluations of candidates; 
and (b) significant (.01 level) in predicting presidential votes (2003). Using a different 
independent variable developed the concept of “buying” a clean environment, not measuring 
simply the trade-off between environment and jobs as mutually exclusive positions. 
Expanding presidential vote choice analysis beyond just the 1996 presidential election 
studied by Guber (2001b) and Davis & Wurth (2003), Davis, et al., studied presidential elections 
from 1984 to 2000 (2008: 526). Davis, et al., also used the “spending on environment” question 
as their independent variable (2008: 530) with the candidate feeling thermometer as the 
dependent variable. Support for increased environmental spending was statistically associated 
with a higher rating for the Democratic candidate in all five elections. For Republican candidate 
ratings, the rating for George H.W. Bush in 1988 was positive, but for the other four Republican 
candidates, those who supported environmental spending rated the Republican candidate lower 
(Davis, et al., 2008: 531). With vote choice as the dependent variable, environmental positions 
were statistically significant in vote choice in four of five elections - all elections studied except 
2000 (Davis, et al., 2008: 534). In 2000, environmental spending opinions were significant in 
candidate evaluation, but not in voting choice. (Davis, et al., 2008: 534) Davis, et al., found what 
Guber (2001b) did not: the ability to discern a difference between candidates on environment, 
the importance of the environment as an issue, and a belief that a candidate supported or opposed 
environmental spending thereby explaining the variance in the impact of environmental positions 
on presidential voting (Davis, et al., 2008: 539). As expected, partisanship and, to a lesser degree 
ideology, explained a substantial portion of the variance in vote choice. The environmental 
spending issue, however, was the third most explanatory issue affecting voting decisions, after 
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economics and abortion (Davis, et al., 2008: 532, 540). Davis, et al., concluded that there was in 
fact an environmental vote (2008: 541). The environmental vote was not a separate Green Party, 
but entrenched at least as to some issues within the Democratic Party.  
The Effect of Demographics – Environmentalism by Subgroup 
The findings regarding the effects of demographic variables such as age, race, income, 
education, and gender have been mixed. Most studies finding environmental attitude association 
with various respondent characteristics also found a strong association with ideology or partisan 
identification, making references to ideology and party identification (discussed in more detail in 
the section above) unavoidable when discussing the demographic variables. Many studies 
include a variety of demographic aspects as control variables, often finding one or more 
demographic variables significantly associated with environmentalism, while similar studies with 
similar demographic variables find other characteristics significant. Variables are discussed 
individually, to the extent possible. Exploration of the literature regarding demographic variables 
often necessitates discussion of multiple variables within the study as that study is discussed, 
rather than discussing each variable one by one.  
Dunlap (1980) provided an early theoretical framework as to why a particular 
demographic variable may be significant in explaining levels of environmental support: 
x Younger respondents are more environmentally supportive either as being less 
invested in the economic system, or as being socialized during times of increased 
environmental awareness of concern. Age should therefore be inversely related to 
environmental support.  
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x Education, income, and occupation prestige, as indicators of higher social classes, 
should be positively associated with environmental support; either from increased 
knowledge and interest, or increased time and resources for participation; essentially 
a Postmaterialist view of environmentalism.   
x Residence of the respondent, with urban persons more environmentally concerned 
having more direct exposure to environmental hazard, and rural residents less 
environmentally supportive being dependent for personal livelihood on the ability to 
use environmental resources without regulation for agriculture, and in the extractive 
industries of mining and timber. 
x Party Identification and ideology, with Democrats and liberals being more 
environmentally supportive.  
x Gender. Males could be more environmentally supportive having the education and 
resources to be politically active. Alternatively, men could be concerned about jobs 
and economic growth, and therefore less environmentally supportive. [Remember, 
this is research from before 1980!] 
(Summary of literature review; Dunlap 1980: 182-186, theory organization by Dunlap). In his 
synthesis and review of previous literature, Dunlap found general but not complete support for 
the age thesis, some support for increased education levels increasing pro-environmental 
attitudes, contradictory findings regarding income, only moderate support for occupational 
prestige, residence most associated with localized environmental concerns, inconclusive 
evidence on gender, only a modest and weak correlation for party identification, and strong 
support for ideological differences in environmental support (Dunlap 1980: 189-192, 
summarized in Table 1: 186-187). The age thesis, part of the Postmaterial thesis regarding 
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education, and ideology seemed supported by the research reviewed by Dunlap (1980) with only 
limited support at best for the other theories.  
The studies finding generalized environmental support, such as Guber (2003), 
hypothesized that certain variables would affect environmental support. However, age, income, 
education and race were not significant in explaining the variance in levels of support for the 
environment. All groups seemed to be favorable to environmental concerns. Only partisanship 
and ideology seemed to have significance, but only explained a limited amount of variance in 
levels of environmental support. Voters have partisan and ideological differences of views of 
government activism, not any real difference in the underlying concern for environment. Black 
and poor respondents may be slightly more aware of environmental impacts; but performed 
environmentally related participatory actions less frequently. Therefore, it seemed that 
environmental concern may be not be elitist, but the ability to take action (as in multiple policies 
realms) may be elitist (Guber 2003).  
Other studies of the impact of demographic variables regarding variance in levels of 
environmental support and political choices have provided mixed results. Van Liere and Dunlap 
(1980), for example, found a moderate association between age, education, and political ideology 
with environmental concern. Several other studies, however, have not found a strong partisan 
correlation, or significant correlations with demographic attributes. Utilizing results from a 1974 
poll of 548 respondents in Wisconsin, Buttel and Finn (1978) did find some positive correlation 
between identification as a Democrat and support for environmental policy; and a negative 
correlation for support for environment from Republicans. The demographic variables were not 
significant.  
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Early studies showed no gender differences in environmental concern and support for 
environmental politics (van Liere and Dunlap 1980). Theories developed for gender differences 
on environmental support include (1) simple gender socialization, with women raised to be 
concerned and caregivers;  (2) a more complex gender socialization based upon knowledge, with 
women having less scientific knowledge and confidence in scientific ability than men, and 
therefore perceived more risk; or (3) the social roles of women (McCright 2010: 68-72). 
Utilizing annual Gallop Polls taken each March in 2001-2008, inclusive, McCright created two 
dependent variables (an additive scale of three scientific knowledge questions and an additive 
scale of three questions regarding concern about climate change). Using gender as the 
independent variable, and controlling for ideology, party identification, education, age, race, and 
annual income (2010: 73, 75), McCright found that women had more actual knowledge than 
men, while men THINK they have more knowledge; and women expressed higher concern 
regarding the environment than expressed by men. There was a small but statistically significant 
difference regarding climate change concern between the genders at the .001 level. Increased 
knowledge was also associated with education, being liberal, and Democratic Party 
identification. Increasing age and being black were negatively associated with knowledge. 
Religiosity was negatively associated with knowledge (.05 confidence) but not significant 
regarding concern about the environment (McCright 2010: 76, 77, 81). McCright rejected the 
extended socialization theory because of increased knowledge, and found social role variables 
(employment, parenthood, and/or homemaker) did not reach statistical significance in 
regressions with party identification, ideology, knowledge, age, race, and education. McCright 
therefore found support only for the simple socialization theory that women were more caring 
(concerned) and therefore expressed higher levels of environmental support. Feminist theory 
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posited that gender differences in levels of environmental support may not be based on biological 
or socialization aspects of gender, but rather on whether a respondent’s ideology was influenced 
by a critique against the dominate portions of society (Somma & Tolleson-Reinhart 1997: 162-
163). Both women and the environment were considered to be in subjugation to the dominant 
social and power elites, who tended to be male. Any increased difference in levels of 
environmental support by women compared to men therefore resulted because more women than 
men expressed a feminist worldview.  
Racial disparity in environmental attitudes may result from (a) a “hierarchy of needs” in 
the Maslow understanding, in which poor and minorities have more immediate survival needs, 
and do not have the time or resources to support less immediate concerns such as 
environmentalism; or (b) “environmental deprivation” in which those most immediately affected 
by environmental hazards have higher levels of environmental concern while wealthier (and 
white) persons could live away from immediate impacts and would be more concerned with long 
range environmental concerns (Whittaker, et al., 2005: 435). The Maslow hierarchy underlies the 
Postmaterialism theory that people in more highly industrialized and wealthier societies removed 
from the immediate survival struggle focus on matters considered “postmaterial” such as 
environmentalism (Whittaker, et al., 2005: 426). 
In the General Social Survey (GSS) data from 1973 to 1990, race was not significant in 
predicting environmental concern (Jones & Dunlap 1992). Blacks and whites were focused upon 
different environmental concerns (Mohai & Bryant 1998). Baldassare and Katz (1992) indicated 
that a perception of environmental threat to the respondent was a more likely predictor of support 
for environmental actions (such as recycling and driving less) than party identification, or the 
demographic factors of age, gender, education or income. General concern levels between white 
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and blacks are often similar (Mohai 1990). Whittaker, et al., used 21 years of survey data (1980 
through 2000, inclusive) from California Field Polls to determine differences in racial and ethnic 
groups to six environmental issues (2005: 439). The six issues were: (1) Are you extremely 
concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned or not concerned at all regarding water 
pollution; (2) levels of concern of protecting the state’s environment; (3) levels of concern 
regarding toxic waste; (4) should spending be increased, remain the same, or decreased for 
environmental spending: (5) whether the respondent self identified as an “environmentalist;” and 
(6) support or opposition to offshore drilling (Whittaker, et al., 2005: 440 Table 1). On the 
concern for water pollution, protecting the state, and toxic waste questions, Latino concern 
started low and increased over time. (Whittaker, et al., 2005: 442-443). African Americans 
showed similar levels of support as whites, except African Americans showed higher levels of 
support for environmental spending. (Whittaker, et al., 2005: 444) Party identification, ideology, 
and gender were statistically significant for all six environmental support measures (Whittaker, 
et al., 2005: 445, 443 Table 2). In summary, white respondents tended to be trending away from 
environmental support, while minority support was increasing over time. The high level of 
minority concern argued against the hierarchy of needs and Postmaterial theories; with the 
highest levels of minority support on the direct matters such as toxic waste. There was a decline 
in all groups in self-identification as environmentalist perhaps because of the negative attacks on 
environmentalism (Whittaker, et al., 2005: 445-446). A later study indicated that race also was 
correlated to perception of environmental threat, with African Americans perceiving more 
environmental threat when other variables are controlled (Jones and Rainey 2006).  
Environmental support among women and minorities may be a reflection of increased 
perception of risk of harm from environmental factors experienced by minorities and women; or 
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stated another way, the significantly lower level of perceived risk among while males, the “white 
male effect” (Satterfield, et al., 2004; Kalof, L., et al., 2002; Flynn, et al., 1994). Baldassare and 
Katz find that young respondents, women, liberals, and Democrats perceived a higher threat of 
environmental harm. These are the usual demographic groups associated with a higher concern 
for environmental issues (1992). The perception of environmental threat to the respondent 
(Baldassare & Katz 1992) may be a result of environmental injustice issues, such as the 
disproportionate placement of environmental risks in minority communities (Mohai, et al., 2009: 
405, 406-7, 410, 422; Satterfield, et al., 2004: 116). Different theories have been developed for 
the reasons for disparate impacts in minority neighborhoods (Jones & Jacques 2014: 418-419; 
see also Mohai, et al., 2009 and Whittaker, et al., 2005: 435, 438, for the history of the 
environmental justice movement). Some studies asserted that non-minorities had more economic 
resources, were more mobile, and more likely to move from locations with environmental 
impacts (Pulido 2000), while other studies indicated that the environmental harms were placed in 
existing minority neighborhoods so that the disparate impact resulted from the initial siting 
decision (Chakraberty 2012: 165, 178, 180; Mohai, et al., 2009: 417; Penderhughes 1996: 235-7, 
243; Ringquist 1997: 818; Pollock & Vittas 1995: 303; Ringquist 2005: 224, 233, 235, 241; 
Pastor, et al., 2001).  The initial siting of environmental harms into minority neighborhoods 
increased, as environmental harms become more known (Mohai, et al., 2009: 413). Such 
placement led to institutionalized racism (Schlosberg 2013: 39). Minorities in Florida were also 
exposed to the environmental risk from environmental harm siting in minority neighborhoods. 
(Chakraberty 2012: 165, 178, 180; Pollock & Vittas 1995: 303)  
In the Satterfield, et al., study, white males consistently showed lower risk assessments 
from 19 activities. White women and non-white males conveyed almost identical increased risk 
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assessment, with the highest levels of risk assessment among non-white women (except for 
assessment of motor vehicle risk in which non-white female risk assessment was identical to that 
of white males) (2004: 118-119; 118: Figure 1). McCright & Dunlap (2012: 222) found lower 
risk concern expressed by conservative white males across eight environmental issues. 
Subjective feelings of discrimination and the personal evaluation of environmental justice issues 
also influenced assessment of risk, so that white males who perceived themselves as vulnerable 
and highly concerned with environmental justice, perceived the risks similarly to other groups 
(Satterfield, et al., 2004: 127-128, 127: Table IV, Table V). While gender and race remain 
significant explanatory variables in assessment of environmental risk, some portion of the “white 
male effect” may be explained because white males saw themselves less at risk (as part of the 
dominant social structure of which neither minorities nor women are a part) and may live in less 
stressed areas. Conservative white males drive the white male effect (McCright & Dunlap 2011). 
White males who are not conservative stated similar attitudes as did non-white males across 
various environmental issues. Overall, the conservative white males were less supportive of the 
environment (McCright & Dunlap 2012: 220-221). Age, income, fulltime employment, and 
parenthood were not statistically significant (McCright & Dunlap 2012: 221). Again, attitudes 
regarding the role of environment in response to environmental concerns affected levels of 
environmental support. Accepting that the environmental risk of climate change existed, for 
example, meant accepting government regulation and threatened the conservative white male’s 
status in the power and elite structure (McCright & Dunlap 2012: 212). Conservative white 
males also made up a significant portion of the Tea Party identifiers (Williamson, et al., 2011: 
27), potentially driving a significant portion of the Tea Party supporters’ anti-environmental 
attitudes.  
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Age seems mixed in determining environmental attitudes. Some studies found that 
increasing age increased environmental support because of lower taxable income (and therefore 
less personal cost to achieve the generalized good of an improved environment or with less cost 
to obtain the environmental good from private purchase) and increased perception of health and 
other risks from environmental threat (Khan 2002). Other studies find that younger respondents 
were socialized with a general Postmaterialistic outlook after the modern environmental 
movement emerged; and therefore expressed higher levels of support for environmental matters 
(Inglehart 1981; Daniels, et al., 2012: 471).  
Increased education was weakly correlated with environment support. Education effects 
on environmental beliefs may vary by partisan identification (Guber 2013). Gallop respondents 
with little information regarding global warming shared similar low levels of concern regarding 
global warming regardless of party identification. Obtaining information regarding global 
warming greatly increased concern about global warming for Democrats and somewhat for 
Independents; but being “well informed” about global warming decreased concern by 
Republicans (Guber 2013: 107 Figure 4). Guber suggested that the increased information 
included partisan cues regarding the different party positions on global warming (2013: 106). 
Therefore, this information may well increase the awareness of Democrats that they should be 
concerned about global warming and of Republicans that environmental concern would lead to 
unpalatable governmental regulation. Awareness both increased support among those who were 
ideologically predisposed for environmental concern, and triggered the opposition to 
environmental issues among those ideologically predisposed to oppose environmental measures, 
especially those from the government. [For every movement there is a countermovement!] 
Education was an important factor in causing the Tea Party attitudinal split within the 
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Republican Party (discussed above), with higher levels of education tending to decrease Tea 
Party support and increase environmental support (Hamilton & Saito 2015: 220-221, 222; 
Hamilton 2012). 
Religious preferences also affected environmental voting. Conservative Christian 
ideology, religious tradition, and active participation in religious practices all have strong bi-
variant negative correlation to support for environmental policy. In a multivariate analysis, 
possessing conservative religious beliefs was the strongest predictor of anti-environmental policy 
support (Guth, et al, 1995). Religion and theological beliefs have long influenced outlooks 
regarding the environment. Different religious beliefs influenced views of whether the 
environment should be feared, subdued, and conquered as the residence of evil and the devil (a 
dominion over nature theology, which influenced early Puritan views of nature, for example) 
(Nash [1967] 2001, p. 15, 17, 31, 35, 262); or appreciated both for human recreation and for its 
own beauty reflecting God’s creation (the spiritual basis for efforts to establish National Parks 
and set aside wilderness, for example) (Nash [1967] 2001, p. 46, 88, 91, 194-95, 197). Religious 
influences upon environmental policy decisions have traditionally been theorized as negative, 
with a view of human dominion over nature and the belief in end times leading to opposition to 
environmental concerns (White 1967; Hand & van Liere 1984; Sherkat and Ellison 2007, p. 71; 
Barker and Bearce 2013, p. 268). The so called “Lynn White Thesis,” that conservative religious 
beliefs have a negative impact on environmental support, has been challenged as not fully 
descriptive of the impact of religion on environmental support (Djupe & Hunt 2009). Evangelical 
anti-environmentalism may be weakening, especially among younger evangelicals (Djupe & 
Gwiasda 2010). Other theological impulses may actually lead to environmental concern and 
support (Kearns 1996). Individuals with liberal theological views use stewardship theology to 
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increase environmental support (Mockabee, et al. 2012). Congregational make up may also 
impact the effect of religious beliefs on environmental support (Djupe & Olson 2010). 
Place of residence may affect levels of environmental support. The rural/urban split in 
political opinions, so significant in other areas (McKee 2008; Bishop & Cushing 2008), may also 
appear regarding support of environmental ballot initiatives (Alm & Witt, 1995). Residents of 
urban counties supported environmental ballot measures at a higher level as compared to rural 
counties (Lowe & Pinhey 1982). Possible explanations of the variance in environmental 
responses between urban and rural respondents included that urban voters observed the effects of 
environmental changes (the differential exposure theory), while rural voters saw the land as 
something to exploit and develop or were more likely employed in extractive mining or 
agricultural activities (extractive theory) (Blankenau, et al., 2008: 58; van Liere & Dunlap 1980). 
Other studies found variances in urban versus rural environmental support but find other 
demographic factors more significant in explaining variances in levels of environmental support 
(Salka 2003).  
Environmentalism is not limited to blue states. Studying Nebraska, with a strong 
Republican Party and few Democratic office holders, Blankenau, et al., utilizing the telephonic- 
conducted 2003 Nebraska Conservation and Environmental Literacy and Awareness Survey, 
considered the effect of party identification (Republican, Democrat, and Independent) and place 
of residence (farm, rural, urban) on (1) environmental support on the question of trade offs 
regarding the economy and the environment; (2) the role of government in environmental 
education; (3) the environmental knowledge of respondents; and (4) the likelihood a respondent 
engaged in environmental friendly behavior (2008: 66). Republican respondents showed support 
for the environmental attitude questions, albeit at a lower level than Democrats. Partisan 
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identification was statistically significant in a multivariate analysis; but the partisan divide on 
environmental matters was not as large as the divide that existed regarding moral issues 
(Blankenau, et al., 2008: 68, 71). Urban or rural residence was not statistically significant, failing 
to provide support to either the differential exposure theory or the extraction theory (Blankenau, 
et al., 2008: 72). Age was inversely significant, with increasing age decreasing environmental 
support and knowledge, except for performing environmentally friendly acts where increased age 
increased environmentally positive behaviors, perhaps as a result of older respondents being 
socialized in the scarcity of the 1930’s and 1940’s (Blankenau, et al., 2008: 72-72).  
Environmental Referenda Elections in America 
One type of election in which environmental attitudes should be important in voting 
decisions is environmental referenda elections. Even in the time period in which environmental 
attitudes did not seem to influence vote choice, Guber (2003) found that statewide referenda on 
environmental issues passed about as frequently as statewide referendums on other matters. This 
result demonstrated that people were willing to vote in favor of an identifiable environmental 
proposal. Guber studied environmental referenda in multiple states, including polling of support 
during the course of the election cycle. Support for environmental issues was high when the 
referenda were announced reflecting the consensus opinion in favor of the environment. During 
the course of the campaign, organized opposition may have emerged. If the organized opposition 
engaged in negative advertising and raised concern about the costs of the environmental 
proposal, previous high levels of support were dramatically reduced during the course of the 
campaign, making passage problematic. Guber suggested that environmental referenda be 
limited in scope, making only small specific changes in environmental policy, so as to be less 
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likely to result in unified opposition. Major changes to environmental policy were more likely to 
be defeated by voters (Guber 2003). Ballot initiative framing may affect whether the initiative 
attracted broad and organized opposition. A ballot initiative was more likely to pass without 
strong opposition or spending in opposition. Negative information and spending generated by 
organized opposition about a ballot initiative initially supported because of generalized 
environmental support, decreased support for the environmental initiative (Guber 2001a: 124, 
128-129). 
 Lake (1983), studying California environmental bond issues and ballot initiatives, found 
electoral success for environmental bond issues but less electoral support for environmental 
initiatives. Lake identified 13 statewide California environmental bond issues between 1970 and 
1980. California voters were asked to approve bonds to pay for specific environmental proposals, 
including spending for parks and water pollution control. Non-environmental statewide bond 
referenda during the same time period were also studied as a control. Approximately 70% of the 
environmental bond issues passed, about the same passage rate as for non-environmental bond 
issues. Statewide environmental bond issues passed in 1978 on the same ballot as Proposition 13 
(the tax roll-back proposition) and passed in the Reagan 1980 general election notwithstanding 
Reagan carrying California in a campaign with marked anti-environmental positions. Lake 
concluded that the success of environmental bond issues at the same rate of non-environmental 
bond issues demonstrated the willingness of voters to pay for the costs of environmental matters. 
In contrast to bond issues with an identifiable and limited funding source, voter initiatives in 
California on environmental issues during the 1970-1980 period did not pass at the same rate as 
environmental bond issues, or non-environmental initiatives. While environmental activists were 
able to obtain the signatures necessary to place an initiative on the ballot, such initiatives passed 
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at about a 25% rate, a significantly lower passage rate than for non-environmental initiatives. 
The environmental initiatives attracted organized opposition, which outspent the initiative 
proponents. Unlike bond issues with a determinable cost (the amount of the bonds, plus interest), 
environmental initiatives were attacked because of the alleged high and unknown costs to 
businesses and voters to implement the initiatives.  Lake concluded that the environmental 
movement was strong enough to garner the grassroots support necessary to place a citizens’ 
initiative on the ballot, but not powerful enough to pass such measures in the face of organized 
opposition and concern regarding the cost of such initiatives (Lake 1983).  Kotchen and Powers 
(2006: 384-305) concurred that bond funding mechanisms and the funding rate determined the 
likelihood of success for environmental ballot initiatives. Coan and Holman studied 29 
environmental initiatives in 13 states from 1994 to 2005, including six in Florida (2008: 1124, 
Table 1). Democratic partisanship explains most of the variance in levels of support, with income 
and education also significant (Coan and Holman 2008: 1125, 1128). 
The partisan split discussed above also appeared in environmental referenda voting.  Bell, 
et al. (2009) created an experiment to measure the willingness of respondents to pay a set amount 
each year in return for a specified improvement in water quality. Starting with a base line 
question of the respondent’s willingness to pay $200.00 per year for a 20% improvement of 
water quality, subsequent questions were designed to determine mean values of the amount 
respondents willing to pay for increased environmental quality (demonstrating the respondent’s 
willingness to pay for a public good) (Bell, et al., 2009: 659-661). Voters were willing to pay 
more than non-voters, perhaps from a willingness to promote public goods through voting; or 
from a willingness to vote when the respondent is interested in public goods. Mean responses 
were higher for Democrats compared to Republicans; and for Gore voters compared to Bush 
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voters (Bell, et al., 2009: 667-669, Table 4 and Table 5). Education, income, membership in an 
environmental group, living in the Northeast United States, and visits to a lake or river were 
significant in increasing the amount a respondent was willing to pay for environmental benefit 
preferences; but race, gender, and living in locations not in the Northeast United States were not 
significant (Bell, et al., 2009: 663 Table 1). The means were higher than median values (skewed 
in favor of the environment, as those who strongly support the environment were willing to pay 
more than others less favorable to the environment). Therefore, to attract the median voter, 
which will assure a majority of votes, Bell, et al., posited that environmental activists should 
craft environmental referenda and policies priced below the mean cost per voter (2009: 667). 
Environmental ballot initiatives may be strategically employed by political parties to 
increase party voter turnout. Smith and Tolbert theorized that political parties endorsed or 
opposed ballot initiatives, and provided financial resources to ballot initiative organizations, 
seeking to (1) increase turn out of party supporters; (2) drive wedge issues against the other 
party; and (3) for ideological reasons (2001: 741, 753). Using aggregate county data, Smith & 
Tolbert found that party identification levels in a county were associated with that county’s vote 
on 77% of ballot initiatives in the 1998 primary and general election (2001: 746-747). 
Examining individual voter data from the Voter News Service Exit Polls for 1994 and 1996, 
partisan identification was the most salient factor to explain California vote choice for two ballot 
initiatives (one considered liberal and one considered conservative) in 1994, two ballot initiatives 
(one considered liberal and one considered conservative) in 1996, the 1994 California 
Gubernatorial election and the 1996 presidential election (Smith & Tolbert 2001: 749, 751 Table 
3). Party identification drove both the partisan election candidate choice and the seemingly non-
partisan referenda election decision. These results bolstered Dolan’s (2005) research finding that 
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Democratic candidates utilized environmental positions on websites, while Republican 
candidates did not. To test the theorized effectiveness of political party activity and cuing on 
individual voting decisions, future research could include survey questions on whether the 
respondent was aware of party endorsement or opposition to environmental referenda, was aware 
of party activities in support or opposition of the initiative, and used such information in position 
taking regarding the environmental initiative.  
Use of the county as the unit of study for referendum voting has been criticized for 
aggregation bias (Wu & Cutter 2011). Using census track data (median 4600 persons) and block 
level data (median 1300 persons) (smaller geographic units of study compared to countywide 
data), Wu & Cutter found that the more high income people residing in the census track, the 
lower level of support for environmental referenda (2011: 555, 557). Respondents with higher 
incomes may have more tax liability and therefore be adverse to the costs of such referenda, or 
may be able to purchase private goods to replace the public goods promoted by the 
environmental referenda (Wu & Cutter 2011: 560-561). The block level data, however, revealed 
a curvilinear effect for income. As the number of high-income persons increased in the block 
data, environmental support decreased, until a certain number of high-income persons were 
reached and then environmental support increased. Similar curvilinear results in the block level 
data occurred for the number of older persons, conservatives, and those engaged in agriculture or 
mining (Wu & Cutter 2011: 558 table 2, 559). Higher levels of education, youth, minority, 
population density, and high levels of urbanization were positively associated with higher levels 
of environmental support; while employment in agriculture or mining was negatively associated 
with higher levels of environmental support  (Wu & Cutter 2011: 555).  
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 The difference in results obtained by utilizing smaller population groups as compared to 
the results from countywide aggregate data suggests that individual beliefs and voting decisions 
may be an important level of analysis regarding environmental ballot initiatives. Branton (2003) 
studied individualized voting behavior in 50 ballot initiatives [not limited to environmental ballot 
initiatives] in 24 states over three election cycles (1992, 1994 and 1996).  Using Voter News 
Service General Election state exit polls, Branton divided ballot initiatives into three broad 
categories “economic/financial” (which included several environmental initiatives), “term 
limits,” and “moral/social issues” (2003: 369).  The independent variable tested was whether the 
respondent took the conservative (coded 1) or liberal (coded 0) position for a particular ballot 
initiative. The conservative position was determined by analysis of various news sources as 
coded by 15 students, with the coding determined to be intra- and inter-coder reliable. The study 
measured partisan affiliation (the dependent variable) by two dummy variables: one coded 1 
Democrat, 0 non-Democrat; and the other coded 1 Independent, 0 non-Independent. 
Demographic control variables were age, income, education, gender, and ideology (Branton 
2003: 370).  Partisanship was a significant predictor of individual voting behavior. Democrats 
voted statistically less conservatively than Republicans in 12 of the 13 economic/financial 
initiatives, in 12 of 14 of the term limit initiatives, and in 21 of 23 of the moral/social issue 
initiatives.  Independents were less conservative than Republicans for economic/financial and 
moral/social initiatives (Branton 2003: 370-376).  The age of respondents increased conservative 
voting in economic/financial referenda, was inconclusive regarding term limit initiatives, and 
increased conservative voting in moral/social issues (Branton 2003: 370, 372). Higher education 
levels affected conservative support (mixed on economic/financial, and less conservative on term 
limits and moral/social issues); and a liberal ideology decreased conservative support in all three 
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types of initiatives (Branton 2003: 370, 372).  Gender and income did not seem to be related to 
individual voting behavior in all three categories of initiatives (Branton 2003: 376). Branton 
studied three 1996 environmental ballot initiatives, included the Florida Sugar Tax initiative, 
discussed in the section regarding Florida initiatives, below. The other two environmental issues 
studied were (1) a Montana water initiative, in which Democrats and Independents were 
significantly less likely to support the conservative position, and age increased conservative 
support; and (2) a Idaho initiative regarding radioactive waste (considered to be a moral/social 
initiative, not an economic/financial initiative) in which partisanship was significant, but no other 
demographic variable reached statistical significance (Branton 2003: 371, Table 1; 375, Table 3). 
In summary, partisan identification, even in elections without overt partisan labels or cues, 
affected individual voting behavior in a variety of initiatives in multiple states over time in the 
1990s. Other demographic variables explained less variance in initiative voting behavior, or were 
not significant.  
Environmental Referenda Support in Florida 
Americans historically have supported “the environment” generally and voted in support 
of environmental referenda, especially with clear and limited funding such as exist in bond 
issues. Floridians share that generalized environmental support (MacManus, et al., 2011: 414-
415).  Various groups supported environmental proposals in Florida for a variety of reasons, 
leading deHaven-Smith to characterize Florida environmentalism as a coalition of different 
groups with a particular concerns, rather than a generalized movement (1998: 294). Florida 
attitudes overall on environmental questions were consistent with national averages.  Floridians 
were within 2% +/- of national average of people who believed global warming is happening, 
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believed global warming was mainly human caused, believed that most scientists believed global 
warming was happening, and somewhat to strongly supported the regulation of CO2 emissions 
(Howe, et al., 2015: 596 Figure 1). In Florida, factors such as income and education increased 
environmental support; but Republican partisanship and being under age 35 decreased 
environmental support (Salka 2003: 266, Table 4). In Florida, the expected increased support for 
environmental measures for younger respondents did not materialize. Salka (2003: 270) 
theorized that the “Green Migration Theory” may explain the unexpected increased 
environmental support by older respondents compared to younger residents in Florida. The 
Green Migration Theory developed by Jones, et al., (2003), posited people moved to Florida for 
the warm climate and other environmentally related reasons.  These older migrants, choosing to 
live in Florida, were more likely to support environmental measures to protect the reasons for the 
choice of retirement location.  
Citizen initiated ballot measures in Florida are limited to constitutional amendments. 
Florida does not have a citizen initiative provision to implement legislation or policy preferences. 
When the legislature failed to act in concert with general public opinion, as in the failure to fund 
the conservation and retirement land trust over multiple legislative sessions, Floridians could 
only change the state constitution to achieve the desired legislative and public policy. Advocates 
for a proposed constitutional change must obtain over 600,000 signatures of registered voters. 
The title, summary, and content of the constitutional amendment must be approved by the 
Supreme Court of Florida as being in conformity with constitutional requirements for such ballot 
measures. To pass, a supermajority of 60% of the voters must approve the constitutional 
amendment (Outler 2008). Historically, environmental constitutional initiatives in Florida have 
proven non-controversial, and passed by wide margins. Florida voters added to their state 
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constitution limits regarding use of fishing nets (1994 71.7% approval); approved requirements 
for Everglade polluters to pay for cleanup costs (1996 68.1% approval); created an Everglade 
Trust fund as part of Forever Florida (1996 58.3% approval); created the Fish and Wildlife 
Commission (1998 72.3% approval); approved property tax exempt status for land encumbered 
by perpetual conservation easement and property tax breaks for lands reserved for conservation 
purposes not permanently encumbered (2008 68.5% approval); and limited property assessment 
increases caused by adding renewable energy devices (2008 60.5% approval). 
Certain specifically Floridian characteristics affected environmental support and voting 
for environment issues. Coastal counties attracted retiring Northerners, so coastal counties may 
be more supportive of environmental referenda than non-coastal Florida counties (Salka 2003). 
Panhandle respondents and non-panhandle respondents showed different levels of environmental 
support. On a county level, non-panhandle Florida counties had higher levels of support 
compared to panhandle counties for the proposition that global warming will cause moderate to a 
great deal of harm to humans. Non-panhandle counties also evidenced higher levels of belief that 
global warming is occurring (Howe, et al., 2015: 596, Figure 1). The urban/rural split in levels of 
environmental support was seen in other ballot measures such as support for anti-Gay Marriage 
ballot initiatives in Florida and California (Salka & Burnett 2012).   
 Branton’s study (2003), discussed above in the section about referenda support generally, 
included one Florida environmental ballot initiative, the 1996 proposal for a sugar tax to pay for 
cleanup expenses in the Florida Everglades. Democratic partisans (and Independents) were 
significantly less likely than Republicans to support the conservative position (a no vote). Having 
a higher income and having less than a high school education were also significant in explaining 
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variance in support. The coefficient estimate for age was negative, as would be expected by the 
Green Migration theory, but only -.07, and not significant (Branton 2003: 371, Table 1).  
Some Concluding Thoughts about American Environmentalism 
 Environmental concerns and pro-environmental attitudes and issue positions initially cut 
across cleavages in American politics and society. The period effects of terrorism and economic 
crisis of the 2000’s, and the increasing mobilization of an anti-environmental countermovement 
during the same period, seemed to lessen this consensus support on the environment. Pro-
environmentalism increasingly was associated with specific groups, with anti-environmental 
attitudes expressed by other groups. At the same time, referenda remained a viable mechanism 
for environmental issues to be enacted, especially as the federal system seemed deadlocked, and 
states varied in environmental responsiveness. In this increasingly polarized environmental 
milieu, Floridians seeking to pass environmental initiatives have to encourage multiple group 
support for the environmental referenda, especially because of the super majority requirement for 
referenda passage in this closely contested swing state. Current data should help first describe 
current environmental attitudes nationally and in Florida, and then give guidance to the factors 
that will help build support for passage of environmental initiatives in Florida.  
 
 
 41 
HYPOTHESES 
The Florida legislature seems unwilling to provide environmental funding, despite high 
levels of public approval for conservation and recreational land acquisitions. Effects of climate 
change, such as Sea Level Rise, are an increasing threat nationally and to Florida (Weiss, et al., 
2011). Multiple possibilities for environmental action by government exist; but political and 
systemic barriers may lessen the effectiveness of certain political arenas to resolve environmental 
policy disputes. Federal action in the courts and in the Congress seems constrained by judicial 
decisions regarding proof of environmental impacts and by legislative intraparty gridlock (Jones 
& Jacques 2014). The current Democratic President and the federal agencies under his direction 
are receptive to environmental concerns. A change in party after the 2016 presidential election 
may foreclose this avenue of federal action. Non-profit environmental activists focus efforts in 
states to advance environmental policy at the state level, and to bring pressure for action at the 
federal level (Hall & Taplin 2010: 65, 68). 
Florida government is not currently responsive to environmental concerns. Executive 
action in Florida on the environment seems unlikely under the current Republican administration 
in which ranching interests control supposed environmental boards, developers control the water 
management boards, and the mere mention of “climate change” is allegedly prohibited in 
executive agency reports. Florida has passed a fair district constitutional amendment, but absent 
court action, no redistricting will occur until after the 2020 census, making changes in the 
makeup of the current anti-environmental legislature unlikely. Environmental activists in Florida 
seemingly have no alternative but to turn to ballot initiatives to amend the Constitution of the 
State of Florida to enact environmental policies.  
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The initial part of this study, using 2012 survey data, will attempt to demonstrate the 
characteristics of individual respondents that shape environmental attitudes in Florida. Each of 
the three environmental questions in the CCES 2012 data will be considered separately, as 
different questions explore different aspects of environmental attitudes (Daniels et al., 2012: 
469). Based upon previous research, Floridians are anticipated to have similar variances in 
environmental views as respondents nationally, with divisions based upon partisan identification, 
opinions regarding the Tea Party, educational and income levels, and to some degree by race and 
gender. Age effects of environmental support in Florida, however, may different than results 
nationally. Older Floridians, who moved to Florida for the favorable environment, may be more 
supportive environmental issues than older respondents generally. This study then attempts to 
analyze the factors leading to overwhelming support for Amendment One in 2014. Amendment 
One passed with 75% of voters supporting. Because of this widespread support, pro-Amendment 
One support should be expected in both parties and in all demographic groups. However 25% of 
Floridians voted against Amendment One. 
In an attempt to understand environmental opinions in Florida generally and the elements 
of support for Amendment One, this study will test the following hypotheses: 
H1 Consistent with the Florida history of bipartisan environmental support, Floridians 
will demonstrate lower levels of difference in opinions across a range of 
environmental issues based upon various demographic, partisan, and opinion 
variables than the differences expressed by Americans nationally. 
H2 Both nationally and in Florida, those respondents who highly approve of the Tea Party 
will express lower levels of environmental support across a spectrum of 
environmental issues than respondents who highly disapprove of the Tea Party.  
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H3 In Florida, the age of respondents will increase levels of support for environmental 
issues for both younger respondents and older respondents, as compared to the levels 
of support for environmental issues for respondents aged 40-59; while nationally 
environmental support will decrease as the age of the respondents increase.  
H4 Although Amendment One ultimately passed with overwhelming voter support, 
certain characteristics will be associated with opposition to Amendment One: 
H4A Republican identifiers will be more likely to oppose Amendment One 
compared with Democratic identifiers.  
H4B The Republican opposition to Amendment One will be driven by the aspects 
of Tea Party support measurable in the data regarding support for 
Amendment One, specifically opposition to President Obama and support of 
Governor Scott.  
H4C Respondents aged 40-59 will oppose Amendment One at higher levels than 
respondents aged 39 and under and aged 60 and older.  
H4D Male respondents are more likely to oppose Amendment One than Female 
respondents.  
H4E Panhandle residents are less likely to support Amendment One than 
respondents who reside in non-panhandle areas of Florida.  
Supporters and opponents to environmental policy positions need information regarding 
the groups most likely to favor the respective policy positions. Environmental activists must be 
strategic in determining the most effective forum to achieve the desired environmental policy. 
Understanding both the characteristics driving the support for Amendment One and the general 
analysis of national and Florida environmental attitudes should add to the knowledge of how 
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environmental concern, attitudes, and policy positions drive environmental beliefs; and the effect 
of environmental beliefs on political action, both nationally and in Florida. This analysis of 
Florida environmental attitudes in general, and specifically with regard to Amendment One 
support and opposition, should provide guidance to environmental activists and opponents in 
future constitutional ballot measures on environmental subjects; and in designing effective 
appeals for the support or opposition to environmental issues generally.  
 45 
DATA AND VARIABLES 
Utilizing two data sources, this thesis will examine environmental attitudes in Florida in 
2012, and analyze more specifically the factors leading to support or opposition to Amendment 
One in 2014.  The 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) comprised 54,535 
Internet interviews conducted by YouGov/Polimetrix in October 2012 and November 2012, 
weighted to reflect population demographics. The CCES included 3850 respondents from the 
State of Florida. The CCES contained approximately 120 questions to identify respondents by 
location, demographic attributes, questions on various issues and elections, and election-specific 
questions. This research utilizes the demographic information; party and ideological 
identifications; attitudes regarding environmental issues; approval of the Tea Party; approval of 
President Obama; approval of Governor Scott; and religious attitudes.  
The Florida Chamber of Commerce engaged Cherry Communications to poll likely 
Florida voters in 2014, including a question to gauge pre-election support for Amendment One. 
The Chamber has made available the data for some of the questions asked in its poll taken in 
September 2014, less than two months before the election. The poll of 813 likely voters 
(identified by voting records confirmed by 100% responding that they were extremely or very 
likely to vote) conducted by telephone interviews September 16-21, 2014, asked respondents for 
their position on Amendment One. The poll found that 75.5% definitely or probably would vote 
in favor of Amendment One, 13.25% probably or definitely against the amendment, and the 
remainder unsure or refused to answer (4 respondents. 0.49% of all respondents refused to 
answer). The margin of error was 3.5%. The poll accurately reported the ultimate election result 
in which 75% of voters supported Amendment One. The poll surveyed respondents’ opinions 
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regarding approval of Governor Scott’s job performance and approval of President Obama’s job 
performance. Demographic questions included age, occupation, party identification, race, 
gender, and media market of respondent.   
 From these two data sets, a rich amount of analysis is possible. All analysis will be 
performed utilizing the “r” computer program. From the CCES data, demographic and attitudinal 
variables will assist in the creation of a profile of those persons more likely to express a pro-
environmental attitude regarding three environmental issues. Models will show the national 
characteristics and the State of Florida characteristics. Two of the three environmental questions 
permit five responses: a highly favorable environmental position, a somewhat favorable 
environmental position, a neutral position with regard to the environmental issue, a somewhat 
unfavorable environmental position, and a strongly unfavorable environmental position. The 
third question is a yes or no question regarding support for the Keystone Pipeline Authorization 
legislation, in which the “no” response is the environmentally favorable position.  Crosstab 
analysis (verified by Chi Square and p test) will identify characteristics leading to support and 
opposition in environmental matters. To test the initial characterizations of environmental 
support, nationally and in Florida these three questions will be the dependent variables in two 
models for each question, one for National respondents, and one for Florida respondents. As the 
dependent variable has multiple possible responses, OLS regression analysis will be employed to 
determine the variables significantly associated with environmental attitudes. The independent 
variable will be a three level party identification variable, considered as two dummy variables, 
with Democrats compared to Independents, and Democrats compared to Republicans. Control 
variables include gender; race; ideology; whether the respondent is “born again” (an 
evangelical); the importance of religion to the respondent; levels of approval of the Tea Party; 
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being retired; residence in the Panhandle (for the Florida models); approval levels of President 
Obama; approval levels of the Governor which for Florida would be then two-year incumbent 
Rick Scott; age (divided into two dummy variables, comparing respondents 18-39 and 
respondents over 60 with respondents aged 40-59, a variable necessarily created to be compatible 
with the age information available in the data regarding Amendment One); whether the 
respondent has children under the age of 18; homeowners compared to renters and others; 
education levels; and family income. The CCES data will also permit a side excursion into the 
debate between Guber (2001) and Davis & Wurth (2003) regarding the impact of environmental 
attitudes on presidential candidate selection in the 2012 election. CCES data regarding 2012 
presidential election choice was transformed into a two option variable scored 0 for Romney and 
1 for Obama (all other responses omitted). As this variable is a yes/no variable, logistic 
regression models were created for the effect of the three environmental questions on 
presidential vote choice, controlled for the same demographic, attitudinal and identification 
variables used for the OLS regressions on environmental attitudes. This analysis will help answer 
H1 through H3.  
Similar analysis will explore demographic variables and attitudes characteristic of 
support or opposition to Amendment One in 2014.  Crosstab analysis with appropriate Chi 
Square and p test verification will identify the characteristics potentially able to explain the 
variance in support and opposition to Amendment One. The Amendment One question permitted 
a four level response (likely to support, probably support, probably not support, definitely not 
supporting – all other responses omitted). OLS regression will determine if any of the observable 
differences in the crosstab analysis of all respondents reach statistic significance. If as 
anticipated, the opposition to Amendment One comes largely from Republican voters, the subset 
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of Republican voters will be analyzed again by OLS regression. Gender will also be studied 
separately, to ascertain any identifiable characteristics explaining any observed variance between 
the genders.  
In all OLS regressions regarding Amendment One, the dependent variable will be the 
four option variable regarding levels of support or opposition to Amendment One. In Model One, 
party identification will be the independent variable, with the demographic and attitudinal 
variables as a series of independent/control variables to determine which variable or variables 
(party identification, age, gender, retired, race, panhandle, support of Governor Scott, opposition 
to President Obama, and a combined additive index of highly favorable to Governor Scott/very 
unfavorable to President Obama as potentially the most conservative respondents) are 
statistically significant in causing all respondents in Model One to oppose Amendment One. In 
Model Two, testing Republican respondents attitudes to Amendment One, gender will be the 
independent variable and the same demographic and attitudinal variables will serve as controls. 
Model Three, the subset of female respondents, will use party identification as the independent 
variable, and the same demographic (except obviously gender) and attitudinal variables will 
serve as controls. This information will help answer H4, and its subparts; and give added 
information regarding the issues raised in H1 through H3.  
Certain variables require further explanation for their use in this study. Age will be of 
particular interest in both data sets to determine if there is any support for the Green Migration 
Theory demonstrated by older voters expressing more environmentally favorable positions. 
Taking information regarding occupation, to create a dummy variable of retired or not retired 
will also test whether retired respondents express different environmental attitudes than others. 
By utilizing the Congressional District variable in the CCES data and the “Media Market” 
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variable in the Amendment One data, a dummy variable for panhandle residence will test 
whether the more conservative Florida panhandle demonstrates different environmental attitudes 
than the remainder of the State of Florida. Neither data set contained enough respondents in 
Florida to make meaningful analysis of attitudes of those in agriculture or extractive industries. 
There was also no ability to create an urban/rural variable.  
Tea Party approval is tested directly in the CCES data regarding the three environmental 
questions. The Amendment One poll did not ask directly regarding respondents’ opinions 
regarding the Tea Party, which would have permitted a direct analysis of the Tea Party/non-Tea 
Party national attitude split within the Republican Party found by Hamilton & Saito (2015) on 
environmental issues. Rick Scott was initially favored in the 2010 Republican Party primary 
election more favorably by Tea Party supporters than his primary opponent. As the faction of the 
Republican Party most likely to support Rick Scott early, it is reasonable to conclude that Tea 
Party members would continue to view Scott the most positively. Tea Party identifiers were also 
among the most intense critics of President Obama; and continued to hold that position. Strong 
anti-Obama sentiment was a strong predictor of Tea Party Support (Maxwell & Parent 2012; 
Maxwell & Parent 2013). Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that Republicans who most 
strongly oppose President Obama are more likely to be Tea Party sympathizers. In the 
Amendment One data, unfavorable opinions of President Obama’s job performance and highly 
favorable approval of Governor Scott’s job performance, and an additive index of those 
respondents most favorable to Governor Scott and least favorable to President Obama, will be 
utilized to measure at least some characteristics of Tea Party supporters on attitudes regarding 
Amendment One. If high levels of approval of Scott and/or high levels of disapproval of 
President Obama, or additive results of both variables, become a statistically significant 
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explanatory factor for why Republicans supported Amendment One (Model Two), there will be 
at least inferential support for the findings of Hamilton & Saito (2015) demonstrating a split 
within the Republican Party.  
 The CCES data and the Amendment One data are different surveys taken two years apart 
using different methodology and therefore not directly comparable. However, certain variables 
are common to both data sets. A final OLS regression for Florida respondents on the CCES 
environmental questions and the respondents regarding Amendment One, utilizing the variables 
available in both surveys, will compare the characteristics of all four environmental issues to 
ascertain if any commonality materializes.  
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FINDINGS 
 Both the CCES 2012 data set and the Amendment One data set provide multiple 
independent control variables. To assure that each variable utilized in this study measured 
distinct characteristics, the association between the independent variable and all control variables 
was calculated. Nationally, the Pearson’s r measure of association between party identification 
and opinions regarding President Obama was .68. (Florida .69). Because of the extreme 
divergence of opinions regarding President Obama by partisans, this moderately strong 
association is not surprising. However, as the association is well below .80, each variable appears 
to be measuring a different characteristic. The association between importance of religion and 
being born again measured .50 nationally and in Florida. The correlation measure for 
ideology/party identification, party identification/Tea Party opinions, and ideology/Obama 
opinions were approximately .45 each. In Florida, those associations, and the association 
between Tea Party support and opinions regarding Governor Scott, were .42 to .46. No 
association between any other two variables exceeded .25. (Florida .35). In the Amendment One 
data, the correlation between party identification and opinions of Governor Scott was .62; again, 
a not surprising result. No association between any other two variables exceeded .33. Neither 
data set seems to have any significant multicollinearity concerns. [Full results not reported, but 
available for review.]  
The 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) included three questions 
relevant to develop the characteristics of respondents leading to environmental attitudes 
nationally and in the State of Florida. The questions tested three different aspects of 
environmental attitudes: (a) respondents’ beliefs regarding climate change; (b) whether 
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respondents considered protecting the environment or protecting the economy as more 
important; and (c) respondents’ support or opposition to a particular piece of federal legislation 
(to authorize the Keystone Pipeline). As these questions involve different aspects of 
environmental attitudes, each question is considered separately (Daniels, et al. 2012). The most 
pro-environmental position for each question is: 
A. Climate change is “a serious problem and needs immediate action” (supported by 
27% of Respondents nationally and 26% of Respondents in Florida). 
B. We should “protect the environment even if we lose jobs or decrease the standard of 
living” (supported by 12% nationally and 11% in Florida). 
C. Opposition to the Keystone Pipeline Authorization legislation (27% nationally; 24% 
Florida).  
Table 1 sets forth the percentage of respondents in various groups who take the most pro-
environmental position regarding the three questions. For all variables, the Chi-Square was 
generally robust and the p score was an exponentially low decimal fraction. [Results not shown, 
but available for review.] Only gender in Florida for attitudes on the environment/jobs trade off 
question (Chi-square 17.56, p score 0.002), gender in Florida for attitudes regarding the 
Keystone Pipeline legislation (Chi-square 9.94, p score 0.002), and those with children and those 
without children regarding the Keystone Pipeline (Nationally: 2.55, 0.1; Florida: 4.29, 0.04), 
show less robust results. At least initially, the observed difference within groups on 
environmental attitudes did not seem to be the result of random chance or measurement error. 
 OLS regression analysis of the five level response (unsure and no responses omitted) 
questions regarding climate change and the environment/jobs tradeoff are set forth in Table 2. 
Even though the Keystone Pipeline question has only a yes/no response, the OLS regression 
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results are set forth in Table 2, to permit direct comparisons among the three questions. [A 
logistic regression, not reported, of the Keystone Pipeline question found identical magnitude, 
direction, and significance in the results for each variable.] Possible responses to each of the 
three questions moved from the most pro-environmental position to the least pro-environmental 
position. A positive coefficient therefore shows lower levels of environmental support caused by 
a variable; and a negative coefficient shows higher levels of environmental support.  
The extensive variables and number of respondents in the 2012 CCES permitted 
exploration of two areas regarding environmental attitudes that cannot be addressed in the 
Amendment One survey data discussed below. The CCES data of year of birth variable 
permitted the creation of an interval level age variable to examine the apparent increased 
environmental support for respondents aged 40-59 observed in the three part age cohort variable 
in both the CCES data and the Amendment One data. The CCES data also permitted the creation 
of a birth year cohort variable. Figure 1 sets forth the levels of support for the most pro-
environmental position by age cohort for each of the three questions, nationally and in Florida. 
The CCES data, complied in the 2012 election year, permitted the testing of the influence 
of various environmental positions on presidential candidate choice. The CCES included both 
the environment/jobs trade off question Guber (2001b) found not significant in presidential 
choice and a climate change opinion question. (Unfortunately there was no question regarding 
spending levels.) Further, as the OLS regressions show the powerful effect of Tea Party views 
and Obama opinion on environmental positions, 2012 would be the first presidential election 
after the 2010 emergence of the Tea Party and would reflect four years of opinion regarding the 
Obama Administration; both factors not relevant for either Guber (2001) or Davis & Wurth 
(2003). Voting for President Obama in 2012, the variable tested, was a no/yes question, so five 
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models of logistic regression measuring the predicted likelihood of voting for President Obama 
are set forth in Table 3. For all models, a negative co-efficient predicted less likelihood of voting 
for Obama and a positive coefficient predicted increased likelihood of voting for Obama. 
Pre-election polling in September 2014 showed generalized support for Amendment One.  
In the overall population, 85% of respondents expressing an opinion on Amendment One 
supported Amendment One. Overall, 32.8% of respondents expressing an opinion, indicated that 
they would “definitely support” Amendment One. Different subgroups, however, appear to 
express different levels of support for Amendment One (Table 4).  The chi-square and p score 
tests for all variables except race and occupation are initially significant. Table 5 sets forth the 
OLS regression for eight models measuring the impact of various variables on levels of support 
and opposition for Amendment One. A positive coefficient indicates more opposition to 
Amendment One.  With regard to Republicans, only Republican women are statistically different 
in levels of support or opposition for Amendment One. Considering only gender and Obama 
attitudes, both were significant for Republicans. In the model of Republican respondents with all 
aspects considered, only gender was statistically associated with levels of Amendment One 
support (Table 6, Part A). The differences in levels of support of women for Amendment One are 
more complex. Party identification is associated with higher levels of opposition by women, 
except when considering only Obama low approval, which becomes the driver of Republican 
women opposition to Amendment One. In the full model of women respondents, age and race 
were significant, in addition to party identification and Obama support (Table 6, Part 4). Table 7 
reports the similarities in Florida environmental attitudes reported in the CCES and the factors 
associated with support or opposition to Amendment One in OLS regressions utilizing the 
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variables comparable in both data sets. Using the information set out in the Tables and Figure, 
the Hypotheses in this thesis are addressed in the following analysis.  
Environmental Attitudes Nationally and in Florida 
 H1 Consistent with the Florida history of bipartisan environmental support, Floridians 
will demonstrate lower levels of difference in opinions across a range of 
environmental issues based upon various demographic, partisan, and opinion 
variables than the differences expressed by Americans nationally. 
 
Similar percentages of respondents in Florida and nationally expressed support for the 
most pro-environmental position in all three CCES environmental questions (Table 1). 
Democrats, liberals, those for whom religion is not important, those with a very negative opinion 
of the Tea Party, and who strongly approve of President Obama supported the most pro-
environmental position at higher levels than the overall population. Republicans, evangelicals, 
conservatives, those with highly unfavorable opinions of President Obama, and strong Tea Party 
supporters expressed far lower levels of support for environmentalism than the entire population 
(Table 2). The trends hold consistent for the Florida respondents. However, the percentage gap 
between extremes (liberal versus conservative, Tea Party supporters and non-supporters, strongly 
approve and strongly disapprove of President Obama) was smaller among Florida respondents 
compared to national respondents (Table 1). This is perhaps an initial indication that the partisan 
and ideological split on environmental attitudes was not as strong in Florida, reflecting a vestige 
of the previous strong bipartisan consensus on environmental attitudes even during Florida 
gubernatorial administrations generally conservative on other issues.  
Certain groups do not appear to demonstrate much difference regarding environmental 
attitudes. Men and women supported the most pro-environmental attitudes at about the same 
percentage as the general population.  Other groups show splits in attitudes depending on the 
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question asked. Only Hispanics showed higher levels of environmental support. Blacks in 
Florida showed a split in environmental attitudes with lower than average support for climate 
change action, but higher than average support for protecting the environment over jobs and the 
economy. Retired persons nationally and in Florida expressed pro-environmental positions 
regarding climate change consistent with responses overall; but expressed lower than average 
support for protecting the environment over jobs/economy. Even though retired persons no 
longer work, concerns regarding fixed incomes and increased costs from protecting the 
environment may influence this result. Attitudes regarding the governor do not make much 
observable difference in environmental attitudes nationally, perhaps as a result of different states 
with different governors of various partisan and ideological beliefs. In Florida, the opinion 
regarding Governor Scott created a demonstrable difference in levels of environment support. 
Those respondents with a strongly favorable opinion of Governor Scott expressed lower levels of 
environmental support, while those with a strongly unfavorable opinion of Governor Scott 
expressed higher levels of environmental support. Persons with children under 18, who might be 
expected to be more pro-environmental from concern for preserving the environment for their 
children, expressed similar levels of support as those without children under 18. 
The results for party and ideology were different nationally and in Florida. Compared to 
Democrats, Republicans nationally were significantly more likely to express anti-environmental 
views.  In Florida, the party differences were not significant. Conservative ideology was also 
significantly associated with anti-environmental views nationally, with no significance in 
Florida. Views regarding the Tea Party and President Obama, however, have a consistent impact 
nationally and in Florida. As the favorability of the Tea Party decreased, environmental support 
increased; and as the favorability of President Obama decreased, environmental support 
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decreased. Attitudes regarding Governor Scott influenced environmental support in Florida. 
Nationally, differing levels in environmentalism displayed a partisan, ideological, Tea Party, and 
Obama split. In Florida, there was no party or ideological divides. The observable differences in 
environmental attitudes in Florida resulted from opinions regarding President Obama, Governor 
Scott, and the Tea Party.  
 Other variables were significant nationally, but not in Florida. Women nationally had 
significantly different views than men regarding environment issues. For two of the three 
environmental questions, women were more pro-environment than men. For the 
environment/jobs tradeoff question, however, women favored protecting jobs and economy over 
the environment. Non-evangelicals and those to whom religion was not important were more 
environmentally supportive nationally. Religious beliefs were not significant in Florida. 
Increasing levels of education made respondents nationally more environmental; but education 
was significant (at the 0.05 level) in Florida only in the environment/jobs trade off question.  
Race was significant in the environmental/jobs tradeoff nationally decreasing environmental 
support, and increasing environmental support (significance 0.1) in Florida; but otherwise was 
not associated with environmental positions. Florida panhandle residents, a generally 
conservative area, interestingly were more environmentally supportive regarding the 
environment/jobs tradeoff and regarding the Keystone Pipeline. (No similar variable could be 
created nationally, and therefore is omitted from the national regressions.) Being retired, having 
children under 18, being a homeowner versus a renter, and family income generally were not 
significant in explaining variance in environmental opinions.  
Intertwined with the question of the significance regarding differences in environmental 
opinions between different groups, is the question of whether differences in environmental 
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opinions influenced political action. Studies regarding the effect of environmental opinions in the 
1996 presidential election were mixed, with Guber (2001b) finding no significance and Davis & 
Wurth (2003) finding significance for environmental opinions in determining candidate choice. 
In 2012, however, attitudes regarding climate change, the environmental/jobs tradeoffs, and 
attitudes regarding the Keystone Pipeline, individually and collectively, were strongly associated 
with presidential vote choice nationally (Table 3). In Florida, climate change positions were 
strongly associated with presidential vote choice and environment/jobs tradeoff positions were 
weakly associated with presidential vote choice. All three environmental questions measured 
together had no statistical association with presidential vote choice in Florida. However, 
considering only climate change and environment/job trade off in Florida [not reported], climate 
change achieved significance (0.05) while the environment/jobs tradeoff remained associated 
with presidential vote choice at the 0.1 level of significance. Therefore, the lack of significance 
when considering all three environmental positions in Florida in Model Five (Table 3) seemed to 
be explained by the lack of significance in variation of opinion regarding the Keystone Pipeline 
in Model Four (Table 3).  Two strong determinates of environmental positions - opinions of the 
Tea Party and opinions of President Obama – were not present in either the Guber (2001b) or the 
Davis & Wurth (2003) study, but were present by the 2012 election.  
In 2012, differences in levels of support in a variety of environmental issues added to the 
ability to predict a presidential vote. Holding all other variables at their mean, for national 
respondents, the predicted probability [not reported but results available for review] of voting for 
President Obama for persons holding the most pro-environmental position regarding climate 
change was .84. The predicted probability for of voting for President Obama for persons holding 
the least pro-environmental position regarding climate change was .43. For Florida respondents 
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the respective probabilities were .81 and .29. Therefore measured across the full range of five 
possible positions climate change, negative climate change positions decreased the probability of 
voting for Obama by .41 nationally and by .51 in Florida.5 For the environment/jobs tradeoffs, 
measured across the full range of five possible positions of environment versus jobs question, 
changing positions less favorable to the environment decreased the probability of voting for 
Obama by .25 nationally and .38 in Florida. Measured across the range of two possible positions 
regarding the Keystone Pipeline Authorization legislation, supporting authorization of the 
pipeline decreased the probability of voting for Obama by .10 nationally. Therefore, knowing 
environmental positions helped predict the probability of voting for President Obama both 
nationally and in Florida. Interestingly, in a state with a history of bipartisan environmental 
support, anti-environmentalism had a larger decrease in the predictive value than demonstrated 
nationally. Overall, while Republican and Democratic differences were not significant in Florida, 
Tea Party opinions were significant. The difference in predictability of environmental attitudes in 
presidential vote choice was more pronounced in Florida. While there was some evidence of less 
divide between opposing groups in Florida compared with national results, at least in some 
respects, and contrary to H1, environmental divides are emerging in Florida equal to or stronger 
than the divides on environmental issues nationally.   
H2 Both nationally and in Florida, those respondents who highly approve of the Tea 
Party will express lower levels of environmental support across a spectrum of 
environmental issues than respondents who highly disapprove of the Tea Party.  
 
 In Florida, controlling for Tea Party opinions, any observed difference in levels of 
Republican and Democratic environmental support did not achieve statistical significance. For 
Florida at least, the Tea Party/non-Tea Party split within the Republican Party explained the 
different levels in expressed environmental support between Republicans and Democrats. 
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Nationally, however, both party identification and opinions regarding the Tea Party were 
strongly associated with levels of environmental support. Perhaps the long bipartisan 
environmental support and the importance of the environment to the tourism economy in Florida 
had lessened the general anti-environmentalism expressed by Republicans nationally. Further 
study of the CCES data, by state, would determine if respondents in other states are similar to 
Florida; or if in other states there are both interparty and intraparty environmental divides.  
H3 In Florida, the age of respondents will increase levels of support for environmental 
issues for both younger respondents and older respondents, as compared to the levels 
of support for environmental issues for respondents aged 40-59; while nationally 
environmental support will decrease as the age of the respondents increase.  
 
Nationally, environmental support decreased for all three questions as the respondents 
aged. In Florida, however, the middle cohort (ages 40-59) expresses the highest levels of pro-
environmental support for climate change and for the environment as more important than 
jobs/economy. Only regarding the Keystone Pipeline Authorization did the national pattern of 
decreasing support by age emerge in Florida.  Age cohorts were insignificant in explaining 
climate change opinions; and mixed but significant regarding the environment/jobs tradeoff and 
positions regarding the Keystone Pipeline (Table 2). The results for all three questions 
demonstrated that environmental support initially increased from the oldest cohorts, but 
beginning in approximately birth year 1970, declined so that fewer members of the younger 
cohorts expressed the most pro-environmental position than members of the immediately 
preceding cohorts (Figure 1). There is strong support for a “green migration” explanation of 
environmental support in Florida. Nationally and in Florida, generalized support for the 
environment among younger cohorts seems to be lessening in the most recent age cohorts, 
 61 
possibility resulting from increasing anti-environmentalism socialization mitigating any effects 
of environmental awareness or postmaterial attitudes within certain groups and beliefs.  
Amendment One Support 
H4A Republican identifiers will be more likely to oppose Amendment One compared with 
Democratic identifiers.  
 
Republicans expressed lower levels of likely support for Amendment One and higher levels of 
oppositions than Democrats or Independents (Table 4). Republican identification was moderately 
associated with opposition to Amendment One, when controlling only for opinions regarding 
President Obama. Otherwise, Republican identification was uniformly strongly associated with 
decreased levels of support for Amendment One, regardless of other demographic or attitudinal 
attributes. (Table 5). Hypothesis H4A is supported by the data.  
H4B The Republican opposition to Amendment One will be driven by the aspects of Tea 
Party support measurable in the data regarding support for Amendment One, 
specifically opposition to President Obama and support of Governor Scott.  
 
Respondents expressing low level of support Obama, those expressing high approval of 
Governor Scott, and those who expressed the lowest level of support for President Obama and 
highest level of approval for Governor Scott (expected to be the most conservative voters), all 
appeared to express more intention to vote against Amendment One (Table 4). As there is not a 
direct measure of Tea Party support in the Amendment One data, and because Republican 
identification remains significant (Table 5 and Table 6) in the Amendment One data (but not in 
the CCES data) in explaining opposition to Amendment One even controlling for opinions 
regarding President Obama and Governor Scott, some other aspect of Tea Party support – not 
measurable in this data – explained Republican opposition. Including variables to measure racial 
resentment and high levels of opposition to government, two other aspects of Tea Party support, 
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may explain why Republican identification remains significant in the Amendment One data, and 
not in the CCES data. There is, at best, only partial support for the hypothesis that aspects of Tea 
Party support explain any Republican opposition to Amendment One.  
H4C Respondents aged 40-59 will oppose Amendment One at higher levels than 
respondents aged 39 and under and aged 60 and older.  
 
For age, both the youngest and the oldest cohort expressed more support for Amendment One 
than respondents aged 40-59 (Table 4); but the differences in support were significant only for 
the oldest cohort (Table 5). There was partial support for Hypothesis H4C regarding Amendment 
One support; and further evidence in support of older retirees “green migration” explanation for 
environmental support in Florida.  
H4D Male respondents are more likely to oppose Amendment One than Female 
respondents.  
 
As shown in Table 4, men and woman expressed similar levels of definite support, but woman 
expressed lower levels of opposition (female 9.9%, male 19.9%). Females were strongly 
associated in explaining Republican support for Amendment One (Table 6). Analyzing the 
reasons for support or opposition to Amendment One by female respondents was more complex. 
Party identification was associated with higher levels of opposition by women, except when 
considering only Obama low approval, which becomes the driver of Republican women 
opposition to Amendment One. Differences among females in support or opposition to 
Amendment One had more causes. In the full model of women respondents, age and race were 
significant, in addition to party identification and Obama support (Table 6, Part B). The 
significance of the female support for environmental issues in Florida was confirmed in the 
comparison of Amendment One results with the environmental attitudes in the CCES 2012 study 
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(Table 7).  Therefore, there is evidence in support of Hypothesis H4D: male respondents were 
more likely to oppose Amendment One than female respondents.  
H4E Panhandle residents are less likely to support Amendment One than respondents who 
reside in non-panhandle areas of Florida.  
 
Although panhandle residents express less support for environmental matters than residents 
elsewhere in the State of Florida (Table 4; confirmed on other environmental issues in Table 1), 
such expressed differences do not reach statistical significance (Table 5; with similar results on 
other environmental issues in Table 2 and Table 7). Therefore, area of residence in the State of 
Florida does not seem to be an explanatory factor of different levels of support for Amendment 
One.  
Amendment One Opposition in the Context of CCES Florida Environmental Attitudes 
 The CCES data predated the Amendment One vote by two years. CCES contained more 
variables to explain variation in environmental attitudes than are present in the Amendment One 
data. Direct comparisons of factors influencing Amendment One positions and environmental 
positions generally are constrained. Important potential explanatory variables such as ideology, 
education, and income are not available in the Amendment One data. However, party 
identification, gender, and Obama opinion responses are associated with all four environmental 
questions. Floridians reacted to Amendment One based upon the same characteristics that 
affected other environmental attitudes (Table 7).  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The time of consensus environmentalism has passed. A concerted countermovement, 
challenging the science and values underlying environmentalism, has moved the discussion from 
competing ideas of the role of government and the costs to individuals and businesses 
notwithstanding an overall favorable opinion of environmentalism, to a world in which anti-
environmentalism is a political asset. What Guber (2003) thought could never happen is the new 
reality: candidates now intentionally take anti-environmental campaign and policy stances, 
especially among candidates seeking Tea Party approval. Candidates are asserting specific 
environmental positions designed to mobilize voters; voters understand the differences in 
environmental positions; and voters are making candidate choices in part based upon 
environmental position taking. Any question in 1996 about the effect of environmental attitudes 
on presidential vote choice has been answered by 2012: knowing environmental positions of a 
voter does increase the ability to predict that voter’s presidential vote choice. Environmentalism 
no longer cuts across ideological, partisan, and demographic cleavages in political society. The 
intensity of these differences regarding environmental support or opposition within groups may 
not be as pronounced in Florida, but still are evident. Environmentalism has become yet another 
cleavage in American politics and for politics in Florida.  
Nationally, variations in levels of support for environmental issues are explained by 
partisan identification, support for the Tea Party, religious beliefs, and certain demographic 
variables including gender, race, and education levels. In Florida, however, environmental 
attitudes are not determined by partisan identification when other explanatory variables are 
available. Florida environmental opinion differences are strongly associated with ideology, and 
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opinions regarding the Tea Party and elected officials. Gender and race are weakly associated 
with Florida environmental attitudes. When considering environmental policy questions utilizing 
only the more limited variables available in the Amendment One data, partisan identification 
becomes statistically significant regarding environmental matters. These findings support the 
idea that environmental issues in Florida remain somewhat bipartisan; and that the differences in 
environmental support are more correctly identified as a split between Tea Party supporters and 
non-Tea Party supporters, rather than a split between Florida Democrats and Florida 
Republicans. Nationally, there appears to be a split both between Republicans and Democrats 
and between Tea Party Republicans and non-Tea Party Republicans.  
The results of this thesis have implications for further research, for political activists and 
candidates, and for environmental activists. Environmental support is increasing identified with 
particular groups or attitudes. The period effects of terrorism and economic decline, the 
emergence of the Tea Party, and the demonstrable effects of environmental attitudes upon 
political action since Guber’s book-length study (2003) call for a new comprehensive analysis of 
environmentalism in America and in Florida. The finding that multiple environmental issues 
separately or together explain candidate choice indicates that there is an environmental vote. This 
aspect should be studied in future presidential elections, and expanded into statewide and local 
elections. The CCES 2012 data offers the opportunity to study multiple states with large numbers 
of respondents to see if the same cleavages exist in states without the same economy so based on 
the environment, as does Florida. Environmentalism seems to have become part of the “Big 
Sort” of American (Bishop & Cushing 2008) and Florida politics.  
The proponents of the theory that environmentalism is a postmaterial value may well 
argue that effect of environmental opinions on presidential vote choice as found in this study 
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actually is a proxy measure of postmaterialism. Neither the CCES data set nor the Amendment 
One data include any of Inglehart’s Materialist/Postmaterialist question sets, leaving the impact 
of postmaterialistic socialization and worldview on Florida environmental attitudes unresolved in 
this study. The cohort data in the CCES data, and the findings in both the CCES and Amendment 
One data that younger and older respondents both express higher levels of environmental support 
across multiple issues, hint at potential shortcomings in the Postmaterialist theory to explain 
environmental attitudes. As anticipated by the Postmaterialist analysts, levels of pro-
environmental support increase in new cohorts, up to a certain point, after which the percent of 
highest levels of pro-environmental support decline. The even younger cohorts would be 
expected to show more impact of the socialization in a secure and affluent America. The 
declining levels of the highest levels of environmental support among the most recent cohorts 
indicates that other socialization forces, such as a concerned anti-environmental 
countermovement, reduce or even outweigh any Postmaterial worldview. A data set including 
the Materialist/Postmaterialist questions, as well as the extensive attitudinal and demographic 
variables in the CCES data would be beneficial to help answer whether there is a Postmaterialist 
explanation for variance in environmental attitudes nationally and in Florida. 
Political activists from the two major political parties will be expected to draw clear lines 
on environmental issues. Environmentalism and anti-environmentalism may become 
increasingly a wedge issue, a base mobilization issue, and a voting cue. It will be increasingly 
risky for moderate and establishment candidates in Republican primaries to accept the science of 
climatic change or take pro-environmental positions for fear of a well-funded Tea Party- backed 
primary opponent.  
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Environmental activists should craft environmental constitutional proposals in Florida 
likely to pass without attracting a well-funded opposition; and generally mobilize environmental 
support more effectively at the federal, state, and local levels by appeals to those groups most 
likely to support environmental issues.  Because of the limited number of control questions in the 
Amendment One data, this research, at best, describes only some “elements” (in honor of Strunk 
& White’s The Elements of Style) but not all aspects of the coalition necessary to reach 60% 
voter support for future environmental constitutional amendments in Florida. In addition to the 
Democratic voters, largely expected to support a pro-environmental constitutional amendment, 
activists should target female and non-Tea Party Republicans, as those Republicans most likely 
to vote Republican on the partisan ballot but environmentally on the amendment ballot. Activists 
in Florida seem to continue to have initial support among all groups for environmental measures. 
A notable feature of the support in each subgroup for Amendment One is that approximately 
50% of every group expressed “probable” support for Amendment One (Table 4). If any shadow 
of generalized environmental support remains in Florida politics, the uniformity in probable 
support (even in groups with lower levels of definite support and higher levels of opposition to 
Amendment One) demonstrates that the starting point for assessment of Amendment One was a 
desire to “support” the environment. Even with the political “Big Sort” and increasing divides 
nationally and in Florida on environmentalism, future limited Florida constitutional ballot 
amendments on generally popular and non-controversial environmental matters should expect 
voter approval. A constitutional ballot amendment mandating a 20% reduction in carbon 
emissions in Florida, on the other hand, would be expected to garner intense ideological 
opposition, and raise serious questions regarding the ability of proponents to obtain enough 
Republican support – Tea Party or not – to reach the 60% approval vote necessary to be adopted. 
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Nothing about Amendment One triggered any organized opposition willing to fund an 
extensive anti-Amendment One campaign. Amendment One did not create a new program; 
funding was not from general tax revenues but from a specific revenue source, paid only by 
persons purchasing real property. Opponents to Amendment One raised only esoteric arguments 
of keeping the Florida Constitution free of funding mandates and concerns that other groups 
would tie up future funding by constitutional mandate. Neither argument seemed likely to trigger 
the role of government or cost of program concerns that could have increased opposition and 
made achieving supermajority voter support more problematic. Opponents may well have 
overlooked a possible argument that would have reduced that generalized support for certain 
groups: that much of Florida land is already owned by the federal and state governments; and 
that Amendment One should be opposed for concerns of limiting private property rights and to 
avoid ‘big government.’ Currently for the 2016 ballot, there is a solar power constitutional 
amendment, proposed by business interests to oppose government regulation of solar energy. 
Another group is promoting another solar power related constitutional amendment with on-going 
governmental regulation. While neither proposal has yet achieved the required number of 
petition signatures to be placed on the ballot, both propositions on the ballot would make 
competing arguments and would be attempting to mobilize different segments of the Florida 
voting population.  
 Environmental attitudes and beliefs cannot be dismissed as simply personal behaviors, 
inconsequential for political action. Environmentalism has become one of many organizing and 
sorting influencing in American (and Floridian) civic and political society; and an important 
force in motivating and explaining political behavior.  
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END NOTES
 
1 Official Florida election results. Florida Department of State, Division of Elections. 
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?ElectionDate=11/6/2012&DATA
MODE=. Accessed May 5, 2015.  
2 Official Florida election results. Florida Department of State, Division of Elections. 
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?ElectionDate=11/4/2014&DATA
MODE=. Accessed May 5, 2015.  
3 4,238,739 FOR and 1,415,924 AGAINST, a margin of victory of 2,822,815 votes. Official 
Florida election results. Florida Department of State, Division of Elections. 
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?ElectionDate=11/4/2014&DATA
MODE=. Accessed May 5, 2015.  
4 Amendment One received 1,436,541 more favorable votes than votes received by Democrat 
Charlie Crist. Some of those additional Amendment One votes may have come from voters who 
did not support the two major party candidates for governor, and some Democrats may have 
opposed Amendment One. However, as will be developed in this thesis, supporters are expected 
to have much higher levels of support for environmental spending. Therefore, much of the 
increase in support for Amendment One compared to the support for Crist must have come from 
Republican voters. No Election Day exit polling regarding support of Amendment One exists 
that would answer more definitely exactly from where the increased Amendment One vote was 
derived.  
5 This wording reflects and is influenced by the wording for reporting differences in predicted 
probabilities suggested by Professor Pollock in Pollock, P. H., III. (2014). An R Companion to 
Political Analysis. CQ Press, an Imprint of SAGE Publications. Thousand Oaks, California; 
London; New Delhi; Singapore. Page 151.  
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Amendment One Language 
Official Title 
“Water and Land Conservation - Dedicates funds to acquire and restore Florida conservation and 
recreation lands” 
Ballot Summary 
“Funds the Land Acquisition Trust Fund to acquire, restore, improve, and manage conservation 
lands including wetlands and forests; fish and wildlife habitat; lands protecting water resources 
and drinking water sources, including the Everglades, and the water quality of rivers, lakes, and 
streams; beaches and shores; outdoor recreational lands; working farms and ranches; and historic 
or geologic sites, by dedicating 33 percent of net revenues from the existing excise tax on 
documents for 20 years.” 
Constitutional Text 
SECTION 28. Land Acquisition Trust Fund.--  
a) Effective on July 1 of the year following passage of this amendment by the voters, and for a 
period of 20 years after that effective date, the Land Acquisition Trust Fund shall receive no less 
than 33 percent of net revenues derived from the existing excise tax on documents, as defined in 
the statutes in effect on January 1, 2012, as amended from time to time, or any successor or 
replacement tax, after the Department of Revenue first deducts a service charge to pay the costs 
of the collection and enforcement of the excise tax on documents.  
b) Funds in the Land Acquisition Trust Fund shall be expended only for the following purposes: 
 
1) As provided by law, to finance or refinance: the acquisition and improvement of land, 
water areas, and related property interests, including conservation easements, and 
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resources for conservation lands including wetlands, forests, and fish and wildlife habitat; 
wildlife management areas; lands that protect water resources and drinking water sources, 
including lands protecting the water quality and quantity of rivers, lakes, streams, 
springsheds, and lands providing recharge for groundwater and aquifer systems; lands in 
the Everglades Agricultural Area and the Everglades Protection Area, as defined in 
Article II, Section 7(b); beaches and shores; outdoor recreation lands, including 
recreational trails, parks, and urban open space; rural landscapes; working farms and 
ranches; historic or geologic sites; together with management, restoration of natural 
systems, and the enhancement of public access or recreational enjoyment of conservation 
lands.  
2) To pay the debt service on bonds issued pursuant to Article VII, Section 11(e). 
 
c) The moneys deposited into the Land Acquisition Trust Fund, as defined by the statutes in 
effect on January 1, 2012, shall not be or become commingled with the General Revenue Fund of 
the state.  
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Source: 2012 CCES 
Figure 1 - Levels of Pro-Environmental Support by Cohort. National and Florida. 
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Table 1 – Most Pro-Environmental Response, by Group 
 
Climate Change is 
serious and needs 
Immediate action 
Protect environment 
even if lose 
jobs/decrease standard 
of living 
Oppose Keystone 
Pipeline Authorization 
Legislation 
       
 
National Florida National Florida National Florida 
       All Respondents 27.0% 26.0% 12.0% 11.0% 27.0% 24.0% 
       Party Id 
      Democrat 42.3% 38.9% 16.8% 18.1% 37.2% 36.4% 
Independent 27.9% 28.5% 12.1% 9.6% 27.6% 27.6% 
Republican 7.7% 9.8% 3.9% 5.2% 12.4% 11.8% 
Gender 
      Male 26.1% 24.9% 12.2% 13.7% 25.0% 23.5% 
Female 28.2% 27.9% 11.3% 10.7% 28.9% 28.3% 
Race 
      White 26.0% 26.1% 11.1% 10.1% 25.4% 24.3% 
Black 28.0% 22.5% 13.1% 19.8% 32.2% 36.1% 
Hispanic 32.8% 32.6% 12.6% 15.5% 29.3% 25.2% 
Ideology 
      Most Liberal 65.7% 51.8% 35.1% 37.4% 56.1% 51.0% 
Most Conservative 7.2% 8.4% 3.9% 8.4% 14.1% 15.5% 
Born Again 
(Evangelical) 
      Yes 17.4% 19.2% 8.4% 12.4% 19.8% 21.4% 
No 32.3% 30.1% 13.5% 12.0% 30.8% 28.4% 
Religion Important 
      Very 21.3% 23.4% 9.8% 11.0% 21.4% 22.2% 
Not at All 46.3% 41.9% 20.6% 19.8% 43.5% 42.1% 
Tea Party 
      Very Positive 4.8% 1.5% 1.9% NA 5.9% 4.4% 
Very Negative 52.1% 46.3% 21.5% 20.6% 22.3% 32.8% 
Retired 
      Yes 28.1% 27.8% 9.7% 8.5% 21.8% 18.3% 
No 23.4% 22.0% 12.3% 13.2% 28.2% 28.3% 
Obama Opinion 
      Strongly Approve 46.8% 42.7% 21.2% 24.6% 40.5% 38.1% 
       
Strongly Disapprove 8.2% 10.7% 3.6% 3.5% 12.0% 10.6% 
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Governor Opinion 
      Strongly Approve 25.9% 9.8% 12.0% 8.4% 21.9% 9.6% 
Strongly Disapprove 31.4% 29.0% 13.0% 17.9% 30.9% 38.9% 
Age 
      18-39 29.9% 27.0% 12.2% 12.5% 31.0% 34.8% 
40-59 26.9% 30.0% 12.8% 15.0% 27.0% 25.7% 
60+     23.7% 22.2% 9.8% 8.7% 21.1% 16.7% 
Child Under 18 
      Yes 25.4% 25.3% 11.8% 14.0% 26.5% 28.7% 
No 27.8% 26.8% 11.7% 11.5% 27.2% 25.1% 
Home 
      Own 24.7% 25.0% 10.5% 9.5% 24.7% 22.6% 
Rent 31.5% 27.9% 13.7% 15.6% 30.3% 30.4% 
Other 27.3% 31.8% 14.4% 17.9% 31.4% 30.8% 
       
Source CCES 2012 N: National 54,537; Florida 3850  
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Table 2 - Environmental Support by Political and Demographic Variables 
 (OLS Regression) 
 
 Climate Change Envir v Jobs Keystone Pipeline 
 National Florida National Florida National Florida 
       
Intercept 1.928   *** 3.197  *** 2.534  *** 3.386  *** 1.726  *** 1.804  *** 
 (0.077) (0.429) (0.79) (0.338) (0.033) (0.131) 
       
Party Id       
Independent 0.039     + -0.134 -0.089  *** -0.038 0.016 -0.022 
 (0.021) (0.099) (0.025) (0.097) (0.011) (0.042) 
Republican 0.305   *** 0.076 0.092  *** 0.132 0.031     * 0.009 
 (0.030) (0.126) (0.031) (0.135) (0.013) (0.048) 
Gender -0.061  *** -0.135 0.0833  ** 0.052 -0.025  *** -0.048    + 
 (0.017) (0.083) (0.018) (0.079) (0.007) (0.027) 
Race 0.028    -0.029 0.064   *** -0.126   + 0.011 0.039     + 
 (0.018) (0.058) (0.019) (0.067) (0.008) 0.020 
Ideology 0.173   *** 0.069 0.142  *** 0.045 0.031  *** 0.027     + 
 (0.009) (0.045) (0.010) (0.043) (0.004) (0.015) 
Not Born Again  -0.114  *** -0.235   * -0.052    * -0.053 -0.015    + -0.021 
 (0.021) (0.099) (0.022) (0.098) (0.009) (0.032) 
Religion Less Imp -0.045  *** 0.011 -0.069  *** -0.071   * -0.028  *** -0.019 
 (0.008) (0.030) (0.009) (0.032) (0.004) (0.015) 
Tea Party Opinion -0.140  *** -0.157 *** -0.096  *** -0.116   *** -0.022 *** -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.023) (0.006) (0.026) (0.002) (0.008) 
Retired 0.015 0.078 0.036 -0.023 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.020) (0.080) (0.023) (0.094) (0.009) (0.030) 
Panhandle NA -0.107 NA -0.248  ** NA -0.098  * 
 NA (0.076) NA (0.083) NA (0.044) 
Obama Opinion 0.236  *** 0.204   *** 0.219  *** 0.208  *** 0.057 *** 0.051  ** 
 (0.010) (0.046) (0.011) (0.045) (0.005) (0.017) 
Governor Opinion -0.008 -0.110  *** -0.007  -0.093  * -0.017 *** -0.036  ** 
 (0.007) (0.045) (0.007) (0.038) (0.003) (0.014) 
Age       
Older -0.023 -0.110 0.051    * 0.019 0.033  *** 0.069    * 
 (0.020) (0.087) (0.022) (0.099) (0.009) (0.034) 
Younger 0.022 0.074 0.138   *** 0.152 -0.010 -0.073    + 
 (0.023) (0.117) (0.023) (0.105) (0.010) (0.042) 
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Minor Child No 0.016 -0.114 0.054   * 0.033 -0.003 -0.006 
 (0.022) (0.122) (0.023) (0.109) (0.009) (0.041) 
Homeowner       
Rent  -0.024 0.118 -0.026 -0.003 -0.004 0.011 
 (0.021) (0.099) (0.022) (0.084) (0.009) (0.034) 
Other -0.012 -0.129 -0.106   * -0.143 -0.047   * 0.051 
 (0.039) (0.122) (0.045) (0.168) (0.022) (0.082) 
Education -0.036  *** -0.025 -0.043  *** -0.049   * -0.015  *** -0.016 
 (0.006) (0.024) (0.006) (0.025) (0.003) (0.009) 
Family Income 0.001 0.007 -0.043 0.005 -0.001 0.006   ** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) 
Adj R2 .3842 .3487 0.2306 .2473 .1227 .1337 
N 37963 2627 37934 2627 33657 2286 
 
Source: CCES 2012 - Significance *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 + 0.1 
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Table 3 - Effect of Environmental Attitudes on 2012 Presidential Election Choice (Logistic Regression) 
           
 Full Model plus Full Model plus Full Model plus Full Model plus Full Model plus 
 No Envir Variables Climate Change Envir v. Jobs Keystone Pipeline All Envir Variables 
 National Florida National Florida National Florida National Florida National Florida 
           
Intercept 4.258   *** 5.221   ** 5.099  *** 6.783    ** 5.156  *** 7.355    ** 5.222   *** 4.726     * 6.323  *** 7.346     ** 
 (0.475) (1.965) (0.481) (2.244) (0.494) (2.418) (0.545) (1.901) (0.566) (2.442) 
           
Party Id           
Independent -0.924  *** -0.307 -0.865  *** -0.393 -0.942  *** -0.269 -0.925  *** 0.003 -0.879  *** -0.016 
 (0.127) (0.459) (0.123) (0.452) (0.129) (0.471) (0.130) (0.520) (0.129) (0.519) 
Republican -3.069  *** -2.125  *** -2.956  *** -2.288   *** -3.069  *** -2.123  *** -3.051  *** -2.017  *** -2.942  *** -2.051  *** 
 (0.158) (0.559) (0.156) (0.562) (0.161) (0.565) (0.166) (0.611) (0.167) (0.601) 
Gender -0.109 -0.276 -0.141 -0.298 -0.082 -0.265 -0.137 0.192 -0.135 0.150 
 (0.097) (0.466) (0.099) (0.472) (0.099) (0.452) (0.102) (0.408) (0.105) (0.424) 
Race 0.538    *** 0.557     + 0.546   *** 0.531      + 0.523   *** 0.380 0.542   *** 0.571      + 0.528   *** 0.409 
 (0.108) (0.305) (0.107) (0.308) (0.108) (0.293) (0.110) (0.334) (0.110) (0.318) 
Ideology -0.351  *** 0.054 -0.277  *** 0.054 -0.304  *** 0.092 -0.304  *** 0.249 -0.231  *** 0.247 
 (0.063) (0.280) (0.063) (0.264) (0.063) (0.277) (0.066) (0.282) (0.065) (0.285) 
Not Born Again  0.305       * 0.596 0.245      + 0.323 0.303      * 0.421 0.270      * 0.349 0.229     + 0.020 
 (0.126) (0.454) (0.127) (0.471) (0.128) (0.448) (0.131) (0.503) (0.133) (0.494) 
Religion Less Imp 0.365    *** 0.185 0.363   *** 0.235 0.356   *** 0.186 0.386   *** 0.540      * 0.381   *** 0.580      * 
 (0.051) (0.300) (0.052) (0.299) (0.052) (0.294) (0.054) (0.213) (0.056) (0.231) 
Tea Party Opinion 0.366    *** 0.399    ** 0.325   *** 0.400     ** 0.353   *** 0.416    ** 0.336   *** 0.338    ** 0.300   *** 0.407     ** 
 (0.030) (0.128) (0.030) (0.141) (0.030) (0.131) (0.031) (0.144) (0.032) (0.153) 
Retired 0.205      + 1.033      + 0.224      * 1.323      * 0.219     + 1.235    * 0.195 1.359      * 0.239     + 1.634     ** 
 (0.111) (0.529) (0.115) (0.526) (0.115) (0.555) (0.120) (0.595) (0.125) (0.623) 
Panhandle NA -0.152 NA -0.295 NA -0.262 NA -0.316 NA -0.488 
 NA (0.432) NA (0.447) NA (0.436) NA (0.418) NA (0.441) 
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Obama Opinion -2.229  *** -3.473  *** -2.157  *** -3.449   *** -2.184  *** -3.568  *** -2.189  *** -3.629  *** -2.112  *** -3.708  *** 
 (0.076) (0.267) (0.077) (0.257) (0.077) (0.270) (0.079) (0.307) (0.079) (0.319) 
Governor Opinion 0.330   *** 0.631   *** 0.327   *** 0.585      ** 0.324   *** 0.562     ** 0.319   *** 0.653   *** 0.316   *** 0.569     ** 
 (0.057) (0.178) (0.058) (0.188) (0.057) (0.187) (0.060) (0.196) (0.061) (0.209) 
Age           
Older -0.385  *** 0.032 -0.399  *** -0.146 -0.366   ** -0.060 -0.317    ** -0.342 -0.317    ** -0.454 
 (0.109) (0.533) (0.111) (0.529) (0.113) (0.542) (0.116) (0.577) (0.119) (0.603) 
Younger -0.048 0.079 -0.064 0.177 0.014 0.139 -0.031 0.223 -0.007 0.379 
 (0.139) (0.526) (0.138) (0.545) (0.142) (0.509) (0.140) (0.588) (0.143) (0.614) 
Minor Child No 0.267     * -0.261 0.278    * -0.276 0.294      * -0.201 0.289    * -0.139 0.301      * -0.082 
 (0.122) (0.563) (0.122) (0.562) (0.123) (0.534) (0.126) (0.629) (0.128) (0.588) 
Homeowner           
Rent  0.403   ** -0.371 0.413   *** -0.428 0.378    ** -0.417 0.361   ** -0.771 0.364    ** -0.783 
 (0.123) (0.474) (0.123) (0.455) (0.124) (0.452) (0.127) (0.527) (0.129) (0.521) 
Other 0.358 0.290 0.298 0.023 0.215 0.140 0.221 -0.221 0.092 -0.544 
 (0.292) (0.613) (0.304) (0.628) (0.293) (0.599) (0.315) (0.661) (0.324) (0.652) 
Education 0.067     + -0.248    + 0.049 -0.290       * 0.057 -0.342    * 0.063     + -0.134 0.047 -0.243     + 
 (0.036) (0.147) (0.036) (0.147) (0.036) (0.143) (0.037) (0.132) (0.038) (0.135) 
Family Income -0.014 0.003 -0.014 0.002 -0.015 0.009 -0.014 -0.010 -0.014 -0.006 
 (0.009) (0.037) (0.010) (0.038) (0.010) (0.037) (0.010) (0.040) (0.011) (0.041) 
Climate Change   -0.482  *** -0.561     **     -0.384  *** -0.256 
   (0.054) (0.185)     (0.063) (0.216) 
Envir v. Jobs     -0.352  *** -0.479   **   -0.238  *** -0.344     + 
     (0.051) (0.180)   (0.058) (0.181) 
Keystone Pipeline       -0.616  *** -0.547 -0.449  *** -0.571 
       (0.125) (0.395) (0.126) (0.403) 
           
McFadden’s R2 0.815 0.893 0.820 0.897 0.819 0.898 0.810 0.900 0.817 0.906 
           
Source: CCES 2012 – N: National 54,537; Florida 3850 - Significance *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 + 0.1  
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Table 4 - Support for Amendment One, by Group 
 Support for Amendment One    
 Definitely 
Yes 
Probably 
Yes 
Probably 
No 
Definitely 
No 
Chi 
Square 
P 
score 
Initial Significance 
Level 
 
All Respondents 32.8 52.2 9.8 5.1    
 
Party Id        
Democrat 42.6 50.9 4.8 1.7 50.916 3e-09 Yes 
Other 36.6 49.1 10.7 3.6    
Republican 22.4 53.6 14.8 9.2    
Gender        
Male 31.6 48.5 12.7 7.2 14.568 0.002 Yes 
Female 34.1 56.0 6.9 3.0    
Race        
White 32.9 51.6 10.5 5.1 1.141 0.8  
Non-White 33.7 53.7 7.9 4.7    
Age        
18-39 34.7 55.8 6.3 3.2 13.793 0.03 Yes  
40-59 26.3 54.8 13.5 5.4    
60 & Over 37.5 50.0 7.7 5.0    
Occupation        
Retired 37.7 47.4 9.4 5.5 8.316 0.2  
White Collar 
\\Collar - Prof 
29.0 53.8 11.4 5.7    
Other 29.3 58.1 8.6 4.0    
Region        
Panhandle 29.2 51.8 16.8 2.2 16.361 0.01 Yes 
Coastal 36.6 49.7 8.3 5.3    
Other 28.4 56.9 8.1 6.6    
Obama Low 21.2 53.1 15.4 10.3 62.407 2e-13 Yes 
Other 41.1 51.8 5.8 1.3    
Scott High 20.4 50.4 19.5 9.7 23.410 3e-05 Yes 
Other 35.6 51.8 8.4 4.3    
Conservative 18.0 52.0 19.0 11.0 23.317 3e-05 Yes 
Other 35.3 51.6 8.8 4.3    
        
Source: Cherry Communications, Sept 2014 – N: 813 
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Table 5  - Amendment One Support by Political and Demographic Variable (OLS 
Regression) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
Intercept 1.656  *** 1.907   *** 1.612  *** 1.867  *** 1.889  *** 1.920  *** 1.777  *** 1.820    *** 
 (0.045) (0.097) (0.046) (0.099) (0.142) (0.156) (0159) (0.164) 
         
Other 0.156      + 0.144      + 0.079 0.069 0.171      * 0.163      + 0.092 0.090 
 (0.085) (0.084) (0.091) (0.907) (0.085) (0.086) (0.091) (0.094) 
Republican 0.452  *** 0.451   *** 0.249    ** 0.254    ** 0.460  *** 0.461  *** 0.286  *** 0.272    *** 
 (0.063) (0.062) (0.080)  (0.798) (0.065) (0.065) (0.081) (0.085) 
Gender  -0.166   **  -0.161  ** -0.167  ** -0.167  ** -0.157 ** -0.167    ** 
  (0.057)  (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.060) 
Younger     -0.115 -0.125 -0.129 -0.118 
     (0.091) (0.087) (0.171) 0.100 
Older     -0.148    * -0.157    + -0.168   + -0.205      * 
     (0.062) (0.087) (0.087) (0.091) 
Race     0.072 0.089 0.140      * 0.134       + 
     (0.068) (0.069) (0.070) (0.073) 
Retired      -0.009 -0.011 0.002 
      (0.095) (0.095) (0.099) 
Prof      -0.040 0.007 -0.014 
      (0.077) (0.078) (0.081) 
Panhandle      0.056 0.045 0.041 
      (0.084) (0.086) (0.088) 
Coastal      -0.079 -0.046 -0.049 
      (0.067) (0.068) (0.070) 
Obama Low   0.331  ***  0.319  ***   0.311  *** 0.301   *** 
   (0.074) (0.740)   (0.075) (0.084) 
Scott High        -0.005 
        (0.242) 
Conservative        0.084 
        (0.259) 
Adj R2 0.06749 0.07719 0.09757 0.1065 0.08156 0.08143 0.1118 0.1146 
N 704 703 673 672 678 673 643 610 
Source: Cherry Communications, Sept 2014 - Significance codes  *** 0.001   ** 0.01   * 0.05   + 0.1 
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Table 6 - Amendment One Support - Republicans and Women (OLS Regression) 
 
 
 Republicans 
Gender/Obama 
Republicans 
Demographic 
Republicans 
All Variables 
Women 
Party Id 
Women 
Party/Obama 
Women 
Demographic 
Women 
All Variables 
        
Intercept 2.491   *** 2.747   *** 2.543    *** 1.664   *** 1.642   *** 1.629   *** 1.538   *** 
 (0.185) (0.233) (0.306) (0.057) (0.058) (0.147) (0.175) 
        
Other    0.070 0.022 0.138 0.125 
    (0.114) (0.123) (0.112) (0.122) 
Republican    0.270   *** 0.147 0.311    *** 0.210       * 
    (0.080) (0.102) (0.082) (0.106) 
Gender -0.346   *** -0.346   *** -0.338   ***     
 (0.098) (0.097) (0.105)     
Obama Low 0.202      +  0.145  0.214     *  0.193       + 
 (0.119)  (0.139)  (0.096)  (0.107) 
Younger  -0.159 -0.193   -0.259     * -0.264      * 
  (0.177) (0.201)   (0.114) (0.125) 
Older  -0.247     * -0.226   -0.282   *** -0.257      * 
  (0.105) (0.164)   (0.079) (0.118) 
Race  0.011 0.096   0.139 0.218        * 
  (0.140) (0.164)   (0.088) (0.094) 
Retired   -0.074    -0.085 
   (0.181)    (0.124) 
Prof   0.065    -0.007 
   (0.148)    (0.103) 
Panhandle   -0.041    0.025 
   (0.149)    (0.112) 
Coastal   -0.015    -0.061 
        
Scott High   0.284    0.547 
   (0.393)    (0.337) 
Conservative   -0.224    -0.496 
   (0.412)    (0.357) 
        
Adj R2 0.04625 0.049 0.04728 0.02723 0.04186 0.06588 0.08901 
N 288 286 254 348 331 335 293 
Source: Cherry Communications Sept 2014 - Significance codes  *** 0.001   ** 0.01   * 0.05   + 0.1  
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Table 7 - Florida Environmental Attitudes 
 CCES Data  
 Climate Change Envir v Jobs Keystone Pipeline Amendment One 
     
Intercept 2.518        *** 2.949     *** 1.773      *** 1.867       *** 
 (0.267) (0.259) (0.095) (0.0235) 
     
Party Id     
Independent -0.117 -0.178      + 0.024 0.052 
 (0.096) (0.094) (0.039) (0.090) 
Republican 0.263          * 0.131 0.079         + 0.0259      ** 
 (0.123) (0.123) (0.045) (0.083) 
Gender -0.149         * 0.054 -0.052        * -0.151       ** 
 (0.070) (0.068) (0.026) (0.057) 
Age     
Younger 0.042 0.081   0.066         + -0.106 
 (0.102) (0.098) (0.037) (0.090) 
Older -0.112 0.054 -0.061        + -0.158        + 
 (0.075) (0.089) (0.037) (0.086) 
Race -0.062 -0.071 0.027 0.109 
 (0.048) (0.054) (0.019) (0.069) 
Retired 0.052 -0.014 -0.003 0.014 
 (0.071) (0.085) (0.035) (0.085) 
Panhandle -0.069 -0.166     + -0.074         + 0.075 
 (0.074) (0.085) (0.039) (0.073) 
Obama Opinion 0.279       *** 0.309    *** 0.053        *** 0.062          * 
 (0.036) (0.039) (0.015) (0.030) 
Governor Opinion -0.234      *** -0.132    *** -0.044       *** -0.084       ** 
 (0.038) (0.033) (0.012)  (0.028) 
     
Adj R2 0.2794 0.2030 0.1061 0.1017 
N 3336 3359 2971 673 
Source: CCES 2012 – Climate Change. Envir v Jobs, Keystone Pipeline 
Cherry Communications, Sept 2014 – Amendment One 
Significance codes  *** 0.001   ** 0.01   * 0.05   + 0.1 
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